The Effects of Time and Misinformation on Memory for Complete Events by Devitt, Mary K.
University of North Dakota 
UND Scholarly Commons 
Theses and Dissertations Theses, Dissertations, and Senior Projects 
5-1-1995 
The Effects of Time and Misinformation on Memory for Complete 
Events 
Mary K. Devitt 
Follow this and additional works at: https://commons.und.edu/theses 
Recommended Citation 
Devitt, Mary K., "The Effects of Time and Misinformation on Memory for Complete Events" (1995). Theses 
and Dissertations. 3834. 
https://commons.und.edu/theses/3834 
This Dissertation is brought to you for free and open access by the Theses, Dissertations, and Senior Projects at 
UND Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Theses and Dissertations by an authorized 
administrator of UND Scholarly Commons. For more information, please contact und.commons@library.und.edu. 




Master of Arts. University of North Dakota, 1992 
A Dissertation
Submitted to the Graduate Faculty 
of the
University of North Dakota 
in partial fulfillment of the requirements
for the degree of 
Doctor of Philosophy
Grand Forks, ND 
May 
1995
This dissertation, submitted by Maiy K. Devitt in partial ruifdinient of the 
requirements for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy from the University of North 
Dakota, has been read by the Faculty Advisory Committee under whom the work, has been 
done and is hereby approved.
This dissertation meets the standards for appearance, conforms to the style and 




Title: The Effects of Time and Misinformation on Memory 
for Complete Events
Department: Psychology
Degree: Doctor of Philosophy
In presenting this dissertation in partial fulfillment of the requirements for a 
graduate degree from the University of North Dakota, I agree that the library of this 
University shall make it freely available for inspection I further agree that permission for 
extensive copying for scholarly purposes may be granted by the professor who supervised 
my dissertation work or, in his absence, by the Chairperson of the Department, or the 
Dean of the Graduate School. It is understood that any copying or publication or other 
use of this dissertation or part thereof for financial gain shall not be allowed without my 
written permission. It is also understood that due recognition shall be given to me and to 
the University of North Dakota in any scholarly use which may be made of any material in 
my dissertation.
Date c9-G ( ?  ?  3
u
LIST OF TABLES................     v
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS.........................    v»
ABSTRACT............................................   viii
INTRODUCTION............................................................   1
METHOD..............................................     41
RESULTS............. ....................................................................................................... 49
DISCUSSION........................................      57
APPENDICES..............................................................................................................  67
APPENDIX A. SUGGESTED EVENTS DESCRIPTIONS ........................ 68
APPENDIX B PARENTAL CONSENT FORM.........................................  69
APPENDIX C. CONSENT FORM ON E......................................................  80
APPENDIX D CONSENT FORM TW O.....................................................  83







1 Mean Number of Words Uttered and Mean Fieseh Reading
Ease Grade Level (FREGL) Scores by Group and Overall................................ 50
2 Mean and Standard Deviation Values of Number of Words
Uttered (NWU) About Being Lost and Being Hospitalized.......................... . 51
3 Mean and Standard Deviation Values for Number of Words 
Uttered (NWU) in the Two Day and Two Week Conditions by
Group and Overa 11.................................................................      52
4 Mean Ratings of Clarity of Memory for Being L ost.................. ....................  53
5 Mean Ratings of Clarity o f Memory for Being Hospitalized...........................  54
6 Subjects1 Mean Ratings of Likelihood of Occurrence of Being
Lost,........ ...................................................................    54




I would like to thank my advisor, mentor, and dear friend, Dr. Charles Honts, who 
let me spread my wings and take on the challenge of something new and exciting while 
listening to me grumble about the perils and the challenges of research in a new area. 
Thank you for always being there to listen, to advise, and to nurture this new Ph D. 1 
would never have done this without your assistance, advice, and instruction
Thank you to Dr. Elizabeth Loftus for allowing me to take her idea and run with it, 
for technical advice during the design stages, and for moral support during the challenging 
stages of this study. For all your words of encouragement, for all your assistance, for all 
your advice, I thank you and i am grateful. I will sing your praises forever, Beth. Thank 
you also to Dr. David Raskin, my academic grandfather, for his technical advice. I am 
fortunate to have you on my side and as a wonderful, interesting, dear friend.
Thanks also to my committee members, Drs. Douglas Peters, F. Richard Ferraro, 
Henry Slotnick, and Mark Grabe for their advice and direction before, during, and after 
data collection. Your help and service on my committee were assets in seeing this project 
to completion. Thank you, Hank, for your last-minute kind words. I appreciate those 
words more than you may know.
Thank you to the research assistants who helped me collect the data for this study 
from beginning to end: Maripat Oberg, Carmen Erickson, and Krista Hummel, and to the 
others who assisted in data collection (Holly, Linda, Chris, Rachel). Thank you also to all 
(37) of the research assistants (and their parents) who provided me with the subjects for
v
this study and thereby enabled me to see this study through to fruition. I am grateful for 
your interest and your assistance.
Thank you to my parents, Laurence and Mary Ellen Devitt, for all the support and 
encouragement over the years. Though you did nut know, there were times throughout 
the iast year when I was ready to "give up and go home". However, because of your 
insightful words and your love, I found the courage to continue toward my goal in spite of 
the adversity. Thank you, too, for instilling in me the fortitude and the tenacity to aspire 
toward achievement in all aspects of my life I will be forever grateful for the lessons you 
helped me learn, and for the wisdom you showed in letting me learn those lessons myself.
Finally, and most importantly, I thank my children, Brigitte and Caitlin for all of 
the sacrifices they have made throughout the past eight years with very little complaint. I 
also thank you, my daughters, for your unconditional, unfailing love and limitless 
understanding. It is my hope that my enthusiasm for learning has inspired in you the desire 
to ask questions, to learn, to analyze, to know. It is with my deepest love and admiration 
that I dedicate this dissertation to you, Brigitte and Caitlin. If not for you, I would not be 




This study investigated the effects of time and misinformation on memory for
fictitious events in SO students who were given course credit in return for their
participation. During an initial meeting, subjects were provided with descriptions of four 
events. Every subject received fictitious information about spending the night in the 
hospital for an ear infection. One group of subjects was led to believe they had been lost 
in a shopping mail when in fact that had never occurred (The Suggested Lost group). A 
second group of subjects were told to develop a convincing story about being lost in a 
shopping mall (the Imagined Lost group). The third group was comprised of subjects who 
had been lost at a shopping mall at some time during childhood (the True Lost group). All
subjects received additional information about two events that had occurred when they 
were younger. Subjects returned two days or two weeks after the initial meeting and were 
interviewed about their memories for each of the events. Subjects were asked to rate the 
clarity of their memory for the described events as well as how likely it was that each of 
the events had occurred. Interviews were transcribed and subjected to analysis.
Tallies were collected for the number of subjects who developed a memory for a 
fictitious event. Five subjects remembered spending a night in the hospital, and one 
subject remembered being lost in a shopping mail, in spite of independent verifications that
the event had never occurred
The rating scale data were subjected to ANOVAs. There was a significant effect 
of Group on subjects' reports of the likelihood of having been lost in a shopping mall.
Contrast testing revealed significant differences between the False Memory group and the 
True Lost group, as well as between the False Memory group and the Imagined Memory 
group, in the ratings of clarity of the false memory. No other significant effects of Group 
or Time were noted.
INTRODUCTION
A current topic of interest in cognitive psychology centers around the fallibility of 
memory. A great deal of that research has focused on the suggestibility o f memory 
Loftus and her colleagues {e. g., Loftus, 1975; Loftus & Hoffman, 1989; Loftus, Miller, & 
Burns, 1978; Loftus & Palmer, 1974), along with numerous other investigators (e. g., 
Bekerian ,& Bowers. 1983; Belli, 1989; McCloskey & Zaragoza, 1985, Tversky & Tuchin, 
1989; Zaragoza & McCloskey, 1989), have investigated the conditions under which 
memory fails or is affected by misinformation The results of this line of reseat oh has 
suggested that people: (a) are influenced by subjective feelings of familiarity (e. g., 
Moreland & Zajonc, i 977), (b) are likely to rewrite history to fit expectation (e. g.,
Brewer & Treyens, 1981); (c) are influenced by the traumatic content of the event; (e. g., 
Christianson & Loftus, 1987); (d) are subject to developing scripts of the dynamic features 
of events (e. g., Schank & Abelson, 1977); (e) may make mistakes in their distinctions 
between memories of real events, memories of thoughts and feelings about the events, and 
memories of what others have said about the events (e. g., Johnson & Raye, 1981); (£) and 
suffer from distortions of memory because of leading information (e. gM Loftus & Palmer, 
1974). In sum, memory for events, places, or things is not fixed and is affected, both 
overtly and covertly, by the mass of information that we process each day.
Currently there exists a polemic debate over the validity of recovered repressed 
memories. Loftus (1993) notes that there has been a dramatic increase in reports of the
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reco very of memories of childhood sexual abuse that were allegedly repressed for a 
number of years. A haunting question concerns the authenticity of these recovered 
memories, The extremist views in the developing camps claim either that all recovered 
repressed memories are authentic (e g,„ Bass % Davis, 1988; Biume. 1990, Fredrickson, 
1992) or that none of them are authentic (e. g , Ofshe & Watters, 1994) A more 
moderate view is that some memories may be truthful and some may be false memories. A 
major part of the controversy then is: If the memory is not authentic, where did it come 
from? L otos (1993) suggests that material for false memories may come from any of a 
variety of sources, including popular writings, the popular media (television, movies), and 
therapists’ suggestions.
The manner by which false memories may develop is not limited to those 
mentioned above. As alluded to earlier, people are acutely affected by the processes of 
memory acquisition, storage, and retrieval. We are unable to store all of the information 
that confront us on a daily basis. We do not store our memories of conversations exactly 
as they were spoken, nor do we store our memories of events precisely as they occurred 
Instead, we transform the information, storing the most salient features, or the gist Then, 
during recollection the detailed aspects of the event are sometimes absent. It is under 
these conditions that people are likely to reconstruct the event. The reconstructions may 
include incorrect information or even details that were not part of the original event.
There is ample anecdotal and experimental evidence that people are likely to 
reconstruct while remembering emotional events (e g., Lotos & Hoffman, 1992; Lotos 
& Kaufman, 1992; Weintraub, 1991, Wright, 1993). There is also evidence to suggest
that people develop memories for events that have n e w  occurred. One famous example 
n  the M m m m m y of an attempted kidnapping that Piaget developed, apparently as a 
result of hearing the account as a child (Piaget, 1962,. described in Lotos & Ket.ch.ani, 
1991, p. 1:9). Experimental studies also indicate that people can construct memories for 
entire events (e g., Hyman, et a! „ in press; .Laurence & Perry, 1983; L otos &. Coan, in 
press, Pynoos & Nader, 1989; Weekes, Lynn, Green, & Bcemar, 1992), The evidence 
from Lotos and Loan (in press) and Hyman et al. fin press) is especially impressive..
Lotos and Coan devised the following paradigm to investigate the possibility of creating a 
traumatic memory for a complete but nonexistent event through what, has been termed 
implantation (Lotos, 1993), Through the help of a family member, subjects were toid that 
they had. been lost in a shopping mall at the age of five. According to Lotos (1993), 
subjects received the memory for implantation through a narrative description. Lotos 
reported that the narrative for one subject fo particular was as follows
"It was 1981 or 1982 1 remember Chris was 5... We had. gone shopping at the 
University City shopping mall in Spokane. Alter some panic, we found Chris 
being led down the mall by a tall, oldish man (I think he was wearing a flannel 
shirt). Chris was crying and holding the man's hand. The man explained that he 
had found Chris walking around crying his eyes out just a few moments before and 
was frying to help him find his parents." (p. 532)
L otos repotted that within two days,. Chris reported remembering how be felt 
while he was lost, saying that he was frightened that he would never see his. family again. 
After three days, he reported that his mother had told him to "never do that again"
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(p.532). Within the next few days he reported that he recalled the flannel shirt, the snare*, 
and even a dialogue with the old man when the man asked Chris if he was lost. Loft US 
reported the following as Chris's specific recollections two weeks after the implantation 
event
"1 was looking for you guys for a second and I think i went over to- look at the 
store, the Kay-bee toy and uh, we got. lost and I was looking around and I thought, 
TJfa. ok. Fm in trouble now..1. You know. And then i . I thought 1 was never 
going to see my family again, I was really scared yov know. And then this old
%
man, i think he was wearing a blue flannel, came up to me ,.. he was kind of old..
He was kind of bald on top .. he bad like a ring ot gray hair ... and he had glasses,” 
(p. 532)
In a. matter of only two weeks, Chris appeared to have remembered: details of the 
fictitious even*. He also reported that his memory for the event was guile vivid and. lucid. 
When being debriefed, Chris was told that one of the events that had been presented to 
him earlier (five events had been presented) was not. true. He was asked to guess which 
was not true. Chris chose one o f the truthful memories.. When told it was the memory of 
being lost,. Chris was surprised. He still maintained that he could remember the event.
There is also anecdotal, evidence that memories for very traumatic events have 
been implanted The evidence comes from what Loftus ( I f 93) calls “one of the most 
dramatic eases of false memory of abuse ever to be documented - the case of Paul Ingram" 
(p. 532) (e.f. Ofshe, 1992 and Watters, !99t). Ingram was initially taken into custody for 
suspected child abuse, and initially, he denied all allegations of abuse. However, after a
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five month period of intense interrogation and suggestive questioning, Ingram gave 
detailed confessions to child sexual abuse, rape, and participation in satanic cult activity 
(Ofshe, 1992).
Because of the pressure tactics used to elicit the confessions, Ofshe became 
skeptical of t he veracity of I ngram’s confessions Ofshe then tested Ingram's suggestibility 
by inventing a new allegation After hearing of the new allegation, Ingram was unable to 
remember the incident Ofshe then used the same tactics {instructing Ingram to think 
about the scene, to attempt to see the event as it occurred, to "pray on” the scene) to 
induce Ingram to remember the event Within ? few hours, Ingram developed detailed 
(but false) memories of the suggested incident and confessed {falsely) to the new charge.
Despite indications that Ingram had not committed any of the acts of abuse, he did 
not withdraw his plea o f guilty to the charges until it was too late In April, 1990 he was 
sentenced to 20 years in prison, with a possibility of parole after 12 years. His most recent 
motion to withdraw his guilty plea, to the Washington State Supreme Court in September, 
1992, was rejected. The ease will now go to the federal courts
These examples, together with other experimental evidence of the malleability of 
memory, demonstrate that there may be a mechanism by which false memories can be 
crea ted. It is the intention of this study to further investigate the implanted memory 
phenomenon using a paradigm similar to that used by Loftus and Coan (in press).
A number o f areas of s< mtrac study may be brought to bear on the notion that 
one can implant memories for events that have never occurred. To further develop this 
argument, I will first consider memory for gist and schema theory and their relationship to
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distortions in memory. Next, I will consider the effects of misinformation and emotion on 
subsequent memory for events. Finally, I will discuss what is currently known about 
differences between real and confabulated accounts.
Memory for Gist. Memory for Detail
A method used to investigate the role of knowledge in understanding has been 
through studies of gist, distortions, and selections. A number of studies have investigated 
memory for gist and memory for detail (Anderson & Pichert, 1978; Bransford & Johnson, 
1972; Johnson, Bransford, & Solomon, 1973 ). This area of study generally indicates that 
subjects' memory for gist is good, but memory for detail is poor That is, subjects do not 
remember exact words or the precise sequence of events, but they do remember the 
central idea, or the gist.
Bartlett (1932) was an early investigator in the area of memory for gist He was 
particularly interested in what subjects remembered, along with how much and how well 
subjects remembered after a six week delay. He presented his subjects with a passage 
entitled "The War of the Ghosts." Six weeks later, subjects were asked to write an 
account of what the story was about. While subjects did remember the main point of the 
story, the details of the reports differed from the original story There were several 
systematic errors made by subjects during recall. Some of the original details that were 
not mentioned by subjects in their accounts tended to be about information that was not 
well understood by the subjects. Other reported details were not present in the original 
story. These additions, called intrusion errors, concerned unfamiliar or puzzling aspects of 
the original story. When subjects were unfamiliar with aspects of the story, they tended to
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replace it with more familiar details More elusive aspects o f the story were extended with 
details that seemed to make the story more logical and lucid.
Bartlett's observations have consistently been replicated by other investigators.
The evidence suggests that, in general, memory for detail is likely to decline, while 
memory for gist is likely to be quite good. Furthermore, understanding the 
to-be-remembered (TBR) information seems to affect what is and is not remembered.
Bransford and Johnson (1972) also conducted a study similar to Bartlett's. Half of the 
subjects in the Bransford and Johnson study read the following passage;
Watching a Peace March from the Fortieth Floor 
The view was breathtaking. From the window one could see the crowd below. 
Everything looked extremely small from such a distance, but the colorful costumes 
could still be seen. Everyone seemed to be moving in one direction in an orderly 
fashion, and there seemed to be little children as well as adults. The landing was
gentle, and luckily the atmosphere was such that no special suits had to be worn.
At first there was a great deal of activity. Later, when the speeches started, the
crowd quieted down. The man with the television camera took many shots of the 
setting and the crowd. Everyone was very friendly and seemed glad when the
music started, (p. 122)
One sentence in the passage ("The landing was gentle...") was either transformed
or completely omitted by subjects during recall. However, when the passage was 
presented to other subjects with the title, "Space Trip to an Inhabited Planet," subjects
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were much more likely to remember it and much less likely to transform its meaning 
during recall.
Anderson and Pichert (1978) found the same sorts of effects in another study.
They presented passages to subjects wherein two boys were playing in one of the boy's 
homes. One-half of the subjects were asked to read the passage whi le pretending they 
were a burglar. The other subjects were asked to read the passage from the perspective of 
a possible homebuyer. The story had been developed to include information that would be 
especially suited to a potential burglar and information applicable to a homebuyer. During 
recall, subjects in the burglar group remembered more of the burglar information; those in 
the homebuyer group remembered more of the buyer-relevant information.
Taken together, the results of the Bartlett (1932), Bransford and Johnson (1972) 
and Anderson and Pichert (1978) studies suggest that subjects tend to remember what fits 
with their understanding. Furthermore, puzzling information is more likely to either be 
lost or will be transformed. Transformations of information are illustrative of intrusion 
errors. Subjects in these studies were confident in their claims of remembering things that 
had never occurred, especially when it fit with their understanding of the material. An 
additional example of this pattern of intrusion errors comes from Johnson, Bransford, and 
Solomon (1973). Subjects in their study with presented with a sentence that conveyed a 
particular meaning. For example, one group of subjects heard a sentence that implied that 
a harnmet was being used, but a hammer was not specifically mentioned. The other group 
of subjects heard a sentence that suggested a hammer was going to be used, but again the 
hammer was not mentioned. Later, all subjects were presented with a test sentence in
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which a hammer was specifically referred to, and subjects were asked to decide if they had 
heard that sentence before. Subjects in the first group, where use of a hammer was 
implied, were likely to confidently report they had heard the test sentence earlier. Subjects 
in the second group, where potential use of the hammer was suggested, were less likely to 
report they had heard the test sentence earlier. For the first group, it seems likely that a 
hammer became part of the scene whereas, for the second group, the hammer did not 
become part of the recalled event. These results also illustrate the intrusion error 
phenomenon, that is, subjects remembered things that had never occurred because it fit 
with their understanding of the event.
Brewer and Treyens (1981) investigated the effects of intrusion errors in a more 
naturalistic setting. They had subjects wait in an experimenter's office for a short time. 
After a 35 second wait, subjects were taken to another room, told that there was no 
experimental procedure, but that instead, the study was interested in how much subjects 
could remember about the contents of the experimenter's office. Subjects were correct in 
their responses when the items were consistent with expectation (e. g., a chair or a desk). 
Most importantly, subjects remembered seeing items that were not present (e. g., books). 
These results contribute additional support for the effects of intrusion errors on recall for 
events. When asked about specific information, subjects are likely to confabulate, 
providing information that may not have been present at the time of the initial event, but 
which fit with their expectations.
Context. Scripts, and Schemata
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Bekerian and Conway (1988) discussed everyday contexts and their relationship to 
expectations. The everyday approach to context suggests that people hold expectations 
about interactions with others and what might be expected of the interaction. It is 
commonly assumed that the knowledge we gather from society as well as our own 
experiences enable us to anticipate what might take place and how we might appropriately 
respond in a given situation.
Everyday contexts may be roughly divided into one of two general categories: 
Those that are repeated and those that are infrequent (Bekerian & Bowers, 1988). 
Repeated, or frequent, everyday contexts are exemplified by what have become known as 
scripts (Schank & Abelson, 1977). Scripts are essentially general, abstract representations 
of common experiences of events. Closely related to scripts are schemata (in the singular, 
schema). While scripts refer to dynamic knowledge about events, schemata refer to more 
static knowledge about places or things. A common illustration of the script idea is that of 
a "restaurant" script. A restaurant script contains the information that defines what one 
anticipates encountering in a restaurant. The script may contain information about 
entering the restaurant, receiving a menu, ordering the meal, eating the meal, paying the 
bill, and leaving the restaurant. Generally, it is assumed that scripts detail information 
about possible props, actors, events, outcomes, and order of the actions that are related to 
an often-experienced event. However, scripts may also contain event-specific information 
that is related to some past experience when script expectations were violated (Schank,
1982).
The notion of schema can be exemplified by pointing out the things we expect to 
find in a college classroom. Almost certainly a classroom would include a chalkboard, 
tablet chairs for students to sit in, and a podium or desk for the instructor. An overhead 
projector is likely, as is a screen for slides or movies. On the other hand, we would not 
expect to see a tree, a refrigerator, or pillows. A schema then includes the kind of 
knowledge (i. e., knowledge of context and knowledge of contents) that help us to 
categorize different kinds of information about different places (or things). Accordingly, 
what we experience in the world is schematized. What fits with our expectations is 
typically retained; what does not fit is ignored or distorted to make it fit; what is not 
present is assumed to be present.
The conception of schema (Schank & Abelson, 1977) provides an explanation for 
the results of the studies on memory for gist. Indeed, schema theory predicts that what we 
remember about a place, an object, or an event is a function of how closely the situation 
fits with expectation and prior knowledge. The results of the Brewer and Treyens (1981) 
study suggest that subjects expected to find a chair, a desk, and books, but did not expect 
to find a bulletin board in the office. The claim is that we record the gist of what we 
expect, what fits with our previous experience. Then, during recall, we recollect the gist 
of our experience, not the experience as it actually occurred. This is apparently what 
subjects in the Brewer and Treyens study did. It is possible that they modified history to 
make it consistent with their expectations.
In contrast to frequent contexts, infrequent everyday contexts are essentially 
meaningful life experiences, and include such events as a first day at college, a death of a
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family member, or the birth of a child Research in the area of these meaningful life 
contexts have concentrated on autobiographical memory retrieval. These investigations 
(Brown & Kulik, 1977; Rubin & Kozin, 1984) have revealed that infrequent events are 
recalled with more vividness (t. e., the events seemed more visually memorable) than other 
memories. In addition, these memories are more likely to be more surprising, 
emotion-producing, momentous, and rehearsed more frequently than other memories.
Neisser (1988) suggests that autobiographical memory is structured around nested 
and overlapping relationships, and this structure is reflected in the ways we use our 
memories. That is, in recall we use either a general (context) to specific (particulars) or a 
specific to general procedure. For example, we think about what our class in Cognition 
was about, then remember the section on attention, and then remember that we tend to be 
rather selective in choosing to what we should attend. On the other hand, a specific to 
general procedure might begin with attempting to remember where you read the 
infcrmation about levels of processing theory and remember that it was in Cognition class. 
Furthermore, Neisser (1988) suggests that there are links that are dependent on the 
context in which two events take place. So, while I might remember that I had heard 
about reality monitoring at a conference I had attended last month, and about the 
Undeutsch hypothesis at a workshop I attended several years earlier, I may not see the 
similarity between reality monitoring and the Undeutsch hypothesis unless the context is 
appropriate. The link may be dependent on the larger context in which both are being
called to mind.
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Neisser (1988) points out that the structure of links do not last indefinitely because 
we may forget. The events themselves as well as the relationships between them can fee 
lost. However, we tend to lose specific information more quickly. This loss of detailed 
information may result in reconstructions, or a greater likelihood of inferring with the 
particular characteristics of an event. In Neisser’s (1988) words, "That is why memory is 
so vulnerable to unintended distortion and why it so often seems 'true' even when it is 
false" (p.364). Thus, while our overall memory for an event may be generally accurate, 
the finer details are more likely to be riddled with inaccuracies. "In the end, the 
episode-as-remembered may have only the kind of validity that Spence [1982] called 
'narrative truth': It will be truthful in some respects and yet very far from historically 
accurate" (Neisser, 1988, p. 365).
Finally, Neisser (1988) discussed imagery in autobiographical memory. He 
suggested that mental images that accompany autobiographical memories do not provide 
the information that we might think they do. Instead, they may serve an illustrative 
purpose (i. e., the vis .. images may be internally generated, presenting some personally 
important aspect of the event) and not be an authentic likeness of anything that really 
occurred. Neisser points out that "sometimes a never-experienced or even an impossible 
view of se event illustrates a general recollection particularly well." (p. 367) However, 
that does not necessarily indicate that the event occurred in the way that it was visually 
•experienced. The more accurate images of events do not include the person who is 
remembering the event. This implies that an inaccurate (or false) memory for the event 
may include some description of "seeing" oneself expe .encing some event.
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Vivid Memories for Emotional Events
Closely related to the phenomenon of autobiographical memory is "flashbulb" 
memory (Brown & Kulik, 1977). Flashbulb memory concerns the recollections of 
unexpected and significant events that have a vivid and perceptual quality. It has been 
suggested that in flashbulb memories, subjects vividly remember personal circumstances 
about where they were, what they were doing, who they were with, and often the clothing 
they and others were wearing, exact utterances, and the position of the people within the 
room. An early study in this area (Brown & Kulik, 1977) investigated subjects' memory 
for what they were doing when they heard that President John F. Kennedy had been 
assassinated. They found that 79 of their 80 subjects had "flashbulb" memories for the 
event. Brown and Kulik suggested that flashbulb memories are "fixed for a very long 
time, and conceivably permanently, varying in complexity with consequentially but, once 
created, always there, and in need of no further strengthening" (p. 85) The inference is 
that flashbulb memories are veridical records of the event and its circumstances. They 
take the details and claims of vividness that their subjects provided as evidence for the 
existence of flashbulb memories. Other investigators (Pillemer, 1984; Rubin & Kozin, 
1984; McCloskey, Wible, & Cohen, 1988) have reported similar lucidity for other events, 
including the 1980 assassination of John Lennon, the assassination attempt on Ronald 
Reagan in 1981, and the 1986 space-shuttle disaster.
One should be cautious in interpreting these kinds of studies. While the memories 
may be vivid, they may not be accurate. The McCloskey et ah (1988) study indicated that 
subjects’ memory' for the space-shuttle disaster changed over a nine month period. That is,
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the reported memories for the events after a nine month delay were qualitatively different 
from the reports collected three days after the shuttle disaster. These results indicate that 
memory is far from flawless and that subjects may be offering vivid and plausible 
reconstructions of the events.
Wright (1993) investigated the flashbulb memory phenomenon, as proposed by 
Kulik and Brown (1977), with subjects who knew about the 1989 Hillsborough, England 
football disaster. About 5 minutes into the semi-final match of the Football Association
Cup, spectators pushed through the back of the stadium, crushing to death 95 people at
the front. Wright proposed that flashbulb memories would be susceptible to the same 
kinds of biases as everyday memories. That is, he expected that the stability of the 
so-called flashbulb memories would change over' time.
Subjects in the Wright study were interviewed at one of three different sessions: 2 
days, 1 month, or 5 months after the event. They were asked to recall their circumstances 
when they initially heard about the event, to provide ratings of certain features of the 
event, and to write down other events of which they were reminded upon hearing of the 
tragedy. Wright found no support for the Kulik and Brown conception of flashbulb 
memories as permanently fixed; the results indicated that there were systematic biases in
each of the measures. Over time, subjects were more likely to say they had heard about
the disaster on television while in the presence of family members. In addition, over time, 
both persona! and societal importance increased. Finally, after 5 months, subjects were 
more likely to be reminded of general, rather than specific, types of events.
Wright's study suggests that the variability in recall over time may indicate that the 
experience becomes part of a general schema. People may reconstruct their memories 
according to intervening factors For example, after a delay, subjects we e more likely to 
indicate they had initially heard about the disaster on television. However, the incident 
was repeatedly televised in the days following the disaster. As a result, the subjects may 
have modified their memories of how they first heard about the event based on a more 
striking visual image shown on television Wright argued that it may be prudent to 
consider the schematic nature and social function of memory in devising adequate 
explanations for flashbulb memories.
Studies that have investigated memory- for other traumatic events (e g., Loftus & 
Burns, 1982; Christianson & Nilsson, 1984; Brown & Kulik, 1977; Rubin & Kozin, 1984) 
have reported conflicting results. A portion of these studies show some adverse effects of 
trauma on memory for detail. The remaining empirical work suggests that memories, 
especially flashbulb memories are quite well-remembered and long-lasting. Given that 
more mundane events do not seem to be remembered as well as traumatic events (Brown 
& Kulik, 1977; Rubin & Kozin, 1984), and that some details of a traumatic event are 
better remembered than other details, Christianson and Loftus (1987) speculated that 
people are able to better remember emotional events than non-emotional events. Further, 
they hypothesized that there would be differences in what was remembered from the 
emotional versus the non-emotional event Specifically, they expected that there would be 
effects of focus and rehearsal on memory for the emotional event such that subjects would 
find the event overall more memorable over a long period of time, but not remember
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peripheral details of the event Alternatively, t hey expected that subjects in the 
non-emotional condition would be less likely to recall the event after a delay, and better 
remember the peripheral details in the short-term
Christianson and Loftus (1987) found that subjects who witnessed a highly 
emotional event were better able to remember the nature of the event for longer periods of 
time than subjects who witnessed a non-emotional event In addition, when subjects were 
instructed to concentrate on and rehearse the main details, they were able to better 
remember the information On the other hand, recognition memory tests showed that 
peripheral details were not well remembered
While Christianson, and Loftus (1987) were able to demonstrate the selective 
nature of memory and some of the fundamental features of traumatic events, their research 
was not without some inherent difficulties First, similar effects might have been found 
with events that were unusual or unique in some way Second, the stimulus materials used 
in the groups were different enough from each other that the effects may have been due to 
the stimuli and not differences in memory processer . As a result, Christianson and Loftus 
(1991) further investigated the effects o f emotional events on memory in an attempt to 
address the ecological validity problems of their previous studies. They investigated the 
effects of the emotionality of the event on subsequent recall of central and peripheral 
details. They conducted a series of five experiments wherein they equated TBR detail 
information in three different conditions: Emotional, in which an apparently injured 
woman lays beside a bicycle; unusual, in which a woman carries a bicycle on her shoulder; 
and neutral, in which a woman rides a bicycle
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The subjects in the Christianson and Loft us (1991) study were presented with a 
series of slides m which only the content of the slide in the middle of the series was varied 
for each of the conditions. AI! other slides were the same in each of the conditions 
Subjects were then asked to provide information about the central ana peripheral details in 
the critical slide The results showed that people remembered different detail information 
from the emotional event than for the neutral event Moreover, it appeared that subjects 
engaged in different types of elaboration depending group membership In comparison 
with the neutral group, those in the emotional group showed better recall for central detail 
and detriments in recall performance for peripheral detail Christianson and Loftus 
suggest that the enhanced recall of central detail and the deficient recall of peripheral detail 
may be partially due to the attention-getting characteristics of the emotional event.
Subjects may have been attending to the central action and allocating minimal attention to 
the peripheral information These results are consistent with the Easterbrook (1959) 
hypothesis wherein the emotional nature of the event affects selectivity of attention. 
According to Easterbrook, an emotional event results in the narrowing of attention and 
the processing of fewer details.
In his review of the emotional stress and eyewitness memory' literature, 
Christianson (1992) suggests that the available evidence from both field and laboratory 
studies supports the Easterbrook hypothesis. For example, in comparisons of memory for 
central and peripheral details during emotional or neutral experiences, the centra! 
information of the emotional event is better remembered than the central information of a 
neutral event. For neutral events, the peripheral details are better remembered than are
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those of the emotional event. According to Christianson, this pattern of results reveals 
that the interaction between the type of event (emotional or neutral) and type of detail 
(central or peripheral) is mediated by a narrowing of attention as proposed by the 
Easterbrook hypothesis ( i 959). Thus, peripheral and central details will be remembered 
differently depending on the type of event that is witnessed.
When is Memory Accurate
From the review to this point, it is clear that people do have accurate memory for 
the gist of an event, but not for details such as exact wording. Memory is accurate when 
people have a conceptual understanding of the to-be-remembered material,, but memory is 
not accurate when the material is puzzling or cannot be schematized [e. g., Bartiett's 
(1932) "War of the Ghosts" study]. However, subjects appear to remember more than 
might be predicted based on schema theory. Objects, events, and conversations that have 
some personal meaning tend to be weli-remembered. For example, research on 
recognition memory for sentences from television soap operas (Bates, Masling, & Kintsch, 
i 978) revealed good performance in that subjects tended to remember the exact sentences., 
and not just the gist. People are also rather good at remembering the exact location of 
objects. During a final examination, students often remember the location of the TBR 
material. That is, they recall that the information is on the bottom of a right-hand page of 
their notes. When the accuracy of the memory is investigated, students recollections are 
often correct (Zechmeister & McKillip, 1972). Finally, arousal appears to serve a function 
of preserving good memory for an event (Christianson, 1992).
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On the other hand, there is evidence that reconstructions occur during the process 
of remembering any may result in memories that are inaccurate. Reconstructions are likely 
to occur for a number of rea sons First, when people do not understand the information, 
they are more likely to assimilate the information into a schema and reconstruct the 
original event based on schematic knowledge (e. g , Bartlett, 1932). Second, 
reconstructions are more likely when there is a gap in memory that results from inattention 
(e. g., Loftus &. Kallman, 1978). If I did not attend to the event as it was occurring, I will 
not have good memory for the event. In recounting my recollections, I will be more likely 
to reconstruct because of the gap in the memory record Third, interference (i e a 
blurring together of repeated similar events) can lead to reconstructions (Brewer, 1988). 
Fourth, a lengthy delay between encoding and retrieval can result in a gap in memory 
(Anderson & Pichert, 1978). As time passes, less and less is remembered about an event, 
and reconstructions are more likely. Finally, misinformation may have an effect on the 
accuracy of memory. I will discuss this literature next.
Effects of Misinformation
Loftus and her colleagues (Loftus, 197$; Loftus, 1979; Loftus & Hoffman, 1989; 
Loftus & Loftus, 1980; Loftus, Miller, & Burns, 1978; Loftus & Palmer, 1974) have 
conducted numerous studies on the suggestibility of memory and the effects of 
misinformation on the original memory trace. In a typical study, subjects watched a series 
of slides that depicted an automobile accident. They then were presented with a written 
account of the accident. Some of the subjects were presented with new, misleading 
information about the case. For example, the subjects in the misled condition received
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information that referred to a stop sign as a yield sign. The remaining subjects did not 
receive any new information. Then, subjects were asked to recall the initial event In 
general, subjects who were misled were much more likely to take on misinformation as 
part of the memory for the original event. Put another way, in comparison with control 
subjects, those who were misled suffered a 20% reduction in accuracy (Loftus &
Hoffman, 1989). Subjects who were not misled exhibited memory for the original event 
that was much more accurate. This suggests that memory impairment may be a 
considerable cause of inaccurate reporting. The acceptance of erroneous post-event 
information ha* come to be termed the misinformation effect (Loftus & Hoffman. 1989) 
Ceci, Ross, and Toglia (1987) have shown that children are also affected by the 
misinformation effect.
Loftus (1992) reports that misinformation is more likely to be injected when long 
periods of time have passed between the event and the presentation of the erroneous 
information. The detection of discrepancies is reduced when a long interval has passed, 
especially if the information is carefully and surreptitiously introduced. However, she 
notes that subjects seem to overcome the difficulty in detecting discrepancies if they are 
first warned that misinformation might be provided
The effect of misinformation acceptance on the original memory trace has been the 
subject of debate. Loftus and Hoffman's (1989) work suggests that erroneous information 
causes an updating or alteration of a previously formed memory, resulting in a complete 
loss of the original memory trace (trace impairment). Morton, Hammersly, and Bekerian's 
(1985) research suggests that incorrect information adversely affects the accessibility of
the earliest memory trace, but does not modify the original memory (retrieval impairment).
The work of McCloskey and Zaragoza (1985) indicates that the misinformation only 
affects the reports of those subjects who do not remember or who did not encode the 
original incident. Bekerian and Bowers (1983) attempted to investigate the 
retrieval-based explanations suggested by Loftus et al. (1978). Bekerian and Bowers 
(1983) criticized the Loftus et al. (1978) study because while the original slide series had 
been presented sequentially, telling a coherent story, the test slides had been presented in a 
random order. Bekerian and Bowers suggested that the randomized test slides in the 
L ii fh m  ©t al (197H) study, diet not provide adequate the same sort of cues that were 
available at the time of the original event. As a result, during the test series in the Loftus 
et al. (1978) study, subjects were forced to use a retrieval strategy that may not have been 
appropriate to access the original information.
To investigate the notion that the test slide series in the Loftus et al. (1978) study 
was inadequate to examine the effects of misinformation on retrieval, Bekerian and 
Bowers (1983) used essentially the same paradigm as Loftus et al. (1978). They examined 
both the effect of type of postevent information presented and the type of retrieval 
condition at the time of the test and examined the possibility that retrieval environment 
lacked the cues necessary for access of original memories when test materials are 
randomized with respect to the original sequence. Thus, subjects received the stimulus 
slide presentation in a random order or in an order that matched the order presented at 
time of input. They found forgetting of the original memories only in the random 
test-order condition. They concluded that the effects of misleading information noted by
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Loftus and her colleagues (Loftus, 1979, Loftus, et al. 1978) seemed to be dependent 
upon retrieval conditions that existed at the time of the test.
Bekerian and Bowers (1983) argued that the data from the Loftus et al. (1978) 
study did not provide support for the conclusion that the original memory was lost 
because of the introduction of new and conflicting information. Instead they suggested 
that forgetting may have been due to the pervasive problems the memory system has in the 
retrieval of old memories In addition, they proposed that, subjects in the random 
test-order condition were susceptible to the influence of new information because of bias 
in the search strategies subjects used to access the memory. It appears that the critical 
cues that are present at the time of the original encoding are absent during the time of 
retrieval and do not permit a match. As a result, the match is made in comparing the new 
information, rather than the original information, with the critical item.
McCloskey and Zaragoza (1985) have also argued that misleading information 
does not necessarily have an effect on memory for the original event. Instead, they 
suggested that the results of the Loftus et al. (1978) study could be attributed to simple 
forgetting or to lack of encoding of the original event in the first place, either of which 
could result in a gap in the memory trace. Later, when misinformation is introduced, there 
is no original memory to contradict the misleading information, and subjects are likely to 
accept the misinformation as true. On the other hand, they also argue that it is possible 
that the subjects remembered both the original and the post-event information At the 
time of testing, based on the misleading post-event information, subjects may become 
convinced that the original memory is wrong, and choose the new information.
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McCloskey and Zaragoza (1985) then devised « ■•-v.es of studies to investigate 
whether the misinformation effect is ; . - . easons other than memory updating (Loftus, 
1978) The McC y and Zaragoza studies differed from previous investigations in that 
>.ney included, as part of the final test, only the original item and a never seen, never 
mentioned distractor. They reasoned that if postevent information did not affect the initial 
memory trace, then the elimination of the post-event item from the memory test would 
eliminate the misinformation effect.
To test the notion that misinformation was not due to memory updating (Loftus et 
al., 1978), McCloskey and Zaragoza (1985) used a paradigm similar to that in the Loftus 
et al. study. The procedure was as follows: Subjects were presented with a series of 79 
slides which depicted the theft of some money by a maintenance man from an office. As 
part of the slide series, there were three versions of four critical items and each version 
was presented to one-third of the subjects Subjects were then presented with a narrative 
of the event. The narrative introduced misleading information about two of the critical 
items, and unbiased information about the other critical items. Finally, subjects were 
given a modified, forced-choice recognition test about the critical items. The choices 
provided were the original item and a novel item. They found no effects of postevent 
information and concluded that the initial memory trace was not influenced by postevent 
information.
To correct for the possibility that the test used by McCloskey and Zaragoza (1985) 
may have been insensitive to detect the effects of post-event information, Belli (1989) 
used a yes-no test to examine the memory impairment interpretation. He showed subjects
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the same mock crime slide series used by McCloskey and Zaragoza (1985). As in the 
McCloskey and Zaragoza study, one-third of the subjects in the Belli study were shown 
slides of one of three different versions of four critical items. He then presented erroneous 
postevent narrative information to some of the subjects, and neutrai narrative information 
to the other participants. Later, subjects were given a yes-no recognition test that 
assessed the effects of misinformation. The test presented a series of statements that dealt 
with both critical and filler items. For each statement, subjects were instructed to respond 
’’yes" if they remembered seeing the item in question in the slides, and "no" otherwise.
Half of the statements contained information that had not been in the slide series, and the 
remaining statements contained information that had appeared in the slides. The results 
provided empirical support for the acceptance of misinformation, and suggested that 
post-event information may mediate the accurate recollection of the initial event sequence.
Further support for the misinformation effect was supplied by Tversky and Tuchin 
(1989). Their study was similar to that of Belli (1989). Subjects were presented with a 
slide sequence and then read a narrative that introduced erroneous information. Subjects' 
memories were tested using a true-false test. Their results showed that subjects who were 
mislead were more likely to incorrectly accept the misleading information presented in the 
narrative than to correctly reject it. In addition, misled and control subjects were equally 
likely to reject never seen, never mentioned information, suggesting that misleading 
information affects memory for specific items.
The results of the above studies (Loftus, et al., 1978; Bekerian & Bowers, 1983; 
Belli, 1989; Tversky & Tuchin, 1989) provide compelling evidence for misinformation
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acceptance. It is clear that people come to adopt misinformation as part of their memory 
for the event. However, the suggestion that misinformation leads to an impairment of the 
accessibility of the original event (McCfoskey & Zaragoza, 1985) has not been 
conclusively demonstrated.
What factors affect distortions in memory9 Individuals who do not have good 
memory for the initial event are, generally, more susceptible to misinformation, 
particularly young children and the elderly (Loftus, Levidow, & Duensing, 1992). 
Furthermore, the time of the administration of the misinformation and the delay between 
recall is important. Loftus, Miller, and Burns ( i 987) report that a delay between the 
original event and the presentation of misleading information results in a decrease in 
accuracy- Loftus et al. (1978) suggest that the original memory trace may fade during the 
delay, making it easier to alter.
Other empirical evidence suggests that the form of the misleading post-event 
information can have an effect on its acceptance (Loftus & Greene, 1980).
Misinformation embedded in a minor clause in a sentence is more likely to be accepted 
than when it is the direct focus. For example, Loftus and Greene suggested that the 
question, "Did the intruder who was tall and had a moustache say anything?" would result 
in acceptance of the misinformation for the moustache, presumably because the moustache 
is embedded in the sentence. On the other hand, when reading the sentence, "Was the 
moustache worn by the tall intruder light or dark brown?", subjects would be more likely 
to reject the moustache misinformation because it is the focus of the sentence and may be
given more careful consideration
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Finally, the use of explicit warnings also appears to have an effect on 
misinformation acceptance, Greene, Flynn, and Loftus (1982) suggest that when subjects 
are aware of the potential existence of erroneous information they are better able to detect 
discrepancies than if no warning is provided. More importantly, if the warning is given 
just prior to the misleading information, people are better able to detect inconsistencies 
and, thus, more likely to reject the misinformation. As a general rule, then, alterations in 
memory for an event are more likely if the misinformation is not detected immediately.
Loftus (1992) has argued that ”[m]isleading information can turn a lie ir.io 
memory's truth" (p. 123) Do people believe in the memories created through 
misinformation acceptance? The available evidence suggests that they do. Loftus (1992)
proposes that people do believe the memories because of the confidence subjects express
in their reports. However, these reports may be biased by demand characteristics, subject 
to confusions regarding the source (the various attributes that specify the conditions at the 
time the memory was acquired) of their memories (source-monitoring confusions), or 
regarding distinctions between real and imagined events (reality-monitoring confusions). I 
will discuss this area next.
Source Monitoring and Reality Monitoring
In a 1992 review, Lindsay stated the following about source-monitoring 
confusions:
Ever>' autobiographical memory has a source, defined by the conditions under 
which that memory was acquired (where and when the event occurred, in what 
media and through what modalities it was apprehended, etc.). We argued that
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memories do not have abstract "tags" or 'labels’' that specify their sources.
Rather, memories include various kinds of information, such as records of the 
perceptual qualities of an experience, and the sources of event memories are 
identified via decisio -making processes performed when the events are 
recollected. People sometimes struggle consciously to identify the source of a 
recollection, but more often make such attributions without conscious awareness 
of any decision making, {p. 87)
Thus, it is likely that when errors are made in source-monitoring, subjects may come to 
remember seeing something that was initially only verbally suggested. According to 
Lindsay (1993) these source-monitoring errors occur when we make misattributions about 
an event. For example, 1 may remember hearing about the assassination of President 
Kennedy from my mother, but incorrectly remember hearing it on television. Lindsay 
suggests that source misattributions vary with the kind of source information in the 
memory record. I am more likely to make errors in source attributions if my memory for 
the event is ambiguous. Source misattributions are also dependent on how easy or 
difficult it is to distinguish between the possible sources. 1 will be more likely to confuse 
the source of the informat ion if the people are similar than if they are not simil ar. Finally, 
if I must think at length about the possible source of information, then 1 will be more likely 
to make source misattribution errors than if 1 make the decision immediately and 
spontaneously. These notions imply that people may mistakenly attribute memories of 
prior experience to an event they are currently considering.
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Lindsay and Johnson (1989b) investigated the source-monitoring principles in 
regard to the suggestibility of eyewitness memory In contrast to Loftus's updating 
hypothesis, Lindsay and Johnson reasoned that the suggestibility effect was due to a 
failure of source-monitoring processes They tested control and misled subjects about 
their source memories for material that was presented before post-event information (with 
or without misleading information) with one of two tests The standard procedure was a 
yes-no recognition test, and subjects were asked to indicate what information they had or 
had not seen before. The other test procedure, a source-monitoring test, requested that 
subjects point out the source of their memories for the items they recognized They round 
that while misled subjects were able to identify the source of their memories, they were 
still affected by the acceptance of the misinformation when tested with the yes-no test. 
However, when tested with the source-monitoring procedure, the extent of the 
suggestibility effect was reduced
In another study, Lindsay and Johnson (1989a) reversed the order of the event and 
the presentation of misinformation. That is, they introduced the misinformation in a 
narrative form before the subjects witnessed the target event. They argued that in 
presenting the misinformation before the event, support for Loftus's updating hypothesis 
of memory representation for the event would not be supported. Instead the acceptance 
of misinformation would be due to an error in source-monitoring. They found that 
subjects who were misted were affected by the misinformation in the narrative. Taken 
together, the data from the Lindsay and Johnson (1989a, 1989b) seem to preclude the 
likelihood of updating as an adequate explanation for the misinformation effect. Instead,
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the suggestibility demonstrated in these studies appears to reflect a failure in 
source-monitoring identification abilities
While source-monitoring discriminations deal with remembering the who, what, 
where, when, and how (i e., who and what were involved in an event, where and when it 
occurred, and how it was perceived) of an event, a related concept, reality-monitoring, 
deals with the distinctions between real and imagined memories. Are there differences in 
the quality of events that have been experienced and those t hat have been imagi ned? 
Johnson and Raye ( 1981) propose that there are characteristic differences. They suggest 
that memories of real events are typically more contextually linked, have more sensory 
attributes, and are more detailed than imagined memories In addition, they assume that 
memories for real events do not show the characteristic indications of cogniti ve operations 
acti ve at the time of the event that imagined memories demonstrate. Put another way, real 
memories reveal a perceptual fluency, while imagined memories do not. Thus, memories 
that are not det ailed, do not include indications of sensory vi vid ness, and are not 
perceptually fluent are more likely to be memories of imagined events. On the other hand, 
vivid and semantically and contextually detailed memories are more indicative of events 
that have been experienced.
Experimental studies of reality monitoring seem to indicate that memory for 
memories for real events have more sensory, temporal and spatial information than 
memories of imagined experiences, and that subjects use this kind of information in 
making reality monitoring decisions (Johnson, 1987; Johnson, Raye, Foley, & Kim, 1982; 
Schooler. Gerhard, & Loftus, 1986; Suengas Sc Johnson, 1988). Furthermore, it seems to
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he more difficult for subjects to make classifications of accounts when the memories under 
consideration are both real or both imagined than if one is real and the other is imagined 
(Foley, Johnson, & Raye, 1983). Finally, subjects make more errors in reality monitoring 
decisions when both real and imagined events are particularly vivid (Johnson, Rave, Wang, 
& Taylor, 1979). The errors may result because both real and imagined events contain 
few indications of cognitive operations, or both contain sensory' characteristics that are 
common to real experiences (Johnson, Foley, & Leach, 1988).
Schooler et a! (1986) examined whether the reality monitoring principles proposed 
by Johnson and Raye (1981) could differentiate between real and suggested memories. In 
a series of five experiments, Schooler et al. (1986) investigated the proposal that there are 
differences in the representation of experienced and imagined events that make evident the 
different processes included in their formation. They suggested that memory descriptions 
based on experienced events would contain more sensory information and this additional 
information would aid in discriminating between real and suggested memories. They 
found that although subjects were not able to adequately monitor the source of their 
memories, the suggested memory descriptions were qualitatively different from 
descriptions of real memory events. Furthermore, the quality of the memories could serve 
as cues for reality monitoring, giving judges the ability to make correct identifications of 
the source of the memory descriptions. Finally, they demonstrated that judges may 
overlook reality monitoring cues. When judges were provided with information about 
possible differences between real and suggested memories, they were able to use the hints 
to improve their discrimination performance However, it appears that the judges were
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provided with information they did not already possess. Taken together, their research 
indicates that while there are differences between suggested memories and memories 
based on perception, the differences are not recognized by either the subjects who 
produced the memories or judges who were asked to distinguish between the memories 
Johnson (1988) and her colleagues (Johnson, Foley, Suengas, & Raye, 1988; 
Suengas & Johnson, 1988) devised a research plan in which they investigated the aspects 
of cognitive experience that create our sense of a personal past and our con viction that 
memories, knowledge and beliefs are tied to reality in a veridical fashion. In their 
investigations, they examined the effects of rehearsal and differences in the qualitative 
characteristics of autobiographical events (e. g., a recent social event the subject had 
attended) and pseudo-autobiographical events (e. g., a dream or a fantasy). The Suengas 
and Johnson (1988) study revealed that there are different effects on how subjects rate the 
qualitative features of the memory that depends on the specific nature of what the subjects 
think or talk about. Rehearsing the perceptual aspects of an event resulted in memories 
for imagined events that were less perceptual (i. e., had less sensory and contextual 
information) than memories for real events. Attending to thoughts and feelings served to 
reduce later access to sensory' and contextual information and tended to make the 
imagined and real events more similar in the amount of thoughts and feelings included in 
the memories. Suengas and Johnson (1988) also suggest that because thoughts and 
feeling are difficult to remember, it is possible that subjects came to believe that the 
thoughts and feelings they rehearsed were ones that they initially experienced. In sum, the 
results of the study suggest that reality monitoring is more likely to suffer if, in
33
remembering the events., subjects focused on thoughts and feelings rather than if they 
focused on sensory and contextual characteristics.
Johnson (1988) also reports that the same kind of information that people use to 
evaluate the reality of their own memories is used when they evaluate the veridicality of 
other people's memories. For example, Johnson and Suengas (1989) have shown that the 
descriptions of events offered by people are affected by the aspects of memories they have 
rehearsed. They found that while rehearsal may result in specific and confident 
statements, it may also have the effect of creating an inaccurate picture of the event. They 
also found that memory for authentic events tend to be phenomenally more perceptual 
than memory for imagined events
Johnson (1988) suggests that social aspects of memory are also important to the 
attributions that people make about the persuasiveness of a source. She argues that 
people will attribute less weight to an admitted made up example. Furthermore, if it is not 
admitted that the example is made up, but the listener assumes it is, the argument will also 
be less persuasive. Nevertheless, as time goes by, initial skepticism may be forgotten, and 
the argument may take on more weight, producing a "sleeper effect" (e. g., Greenwald, 
Pratkanis, Leippe, & Baumgardner, 1986). Thus, over time the elements that form the 
basis for source monitoring may change over time.
Johnson (1988) discussed the practical considerations in investigations of 
descriptions of events versus ratings of the phenomenal characteristics of events. 
Necessitating that subjects put memories into words may serve to make the memory seem 
more real, especially memories for imagined events. While Johnson reports that she and
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her colleagues have consistently found some differences between authentic and imagined 
events with their ratings of the characteristics of each kind of event, Johnson and Suengas 
(1988) did not find significant differences in oral reports from subjects. Subsequently, 
another study (Hashtroudi, Johnson, & Chrosniak, 1989) found that there were significant 
differences between experienced and imagined events when subjects used written 
descriptions. Johnson (1988) speculates that, in comparison with written descriptions, 
better oral descriptions result because of social considerations as when the speaker 
attempts to produce a more cohesive and coherent narrative. In addition, subjects may 
use more rigorous criteria for written records than for verbal records. These effects may 
also exert more influence on imagined events than on authentic events, thereby diminishing 
differences that may otherwise exist between them.
Differences in Truthful and Confabulated Accounts
Evidence from experimental studies seems to show that there are systematic 
differences between taithful and confabulated accounts (e. g., Johnson, 1988; Schooler et 
al., 1986). The details of the Schooler et al. (1986) study are illustrative. In their 
comparisons of recall from subjects who had seen various details in the initial event with 
recall from those who had been exposed to details only through post-event information, 
those who received only the post-event information were less detailed in their accounts. 
This result suggests that details that are present in accounts are based on real, perceptual 
experiences. However, it should be noted that subjects who received only post-event 
information can not be said to have imagined the event. Thus, the findings may not bear 
directly on the issues of distinction between real and imagined memories.
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The Johnson (1988) data seems more suitable in the distinction between real and 
confabulated events. In the reported studies, subjects were instructed to imagine events. 
Later they were asked to recall the imagined events. In comparison to recall for actually 
experienced events, recall for imagined events was less detailed. These data are 
supportive of the argument that there are distinctions between real and confabulated 
events. Nonetheless, Johnson points out that an important factor in this distinction may be 
the mode of recall because subjects' accounts differ depending upon whether they speak or 
write about their memories.
A related notion is the Undeutsch hypothesis (Steller, 1989) which states that there 
are systematic differences between subjects’ reports of real and confabulated events. The 
exact nature of these hypothesized differences have been developed by Steller and 
Koehnken (1989) and Raskin and Esplin (1991). These authors have suggested that the 
truthfulness of an account can be assessed through the presence of specific criteria. That 
is, the presence of certain features is considered to be indicative of truthful accounts, 
although their absence is not necessarily an indication of deceptiveness. A system known 
as Criteria-Based Content Analysis (CBCA) has been developed to apply the Undeutsch 
Hypothesis to real world problems.
In CBCA there are several different categories of criteria. First, there are criteria 
that consider the general characteristics of the statement. Those criteria assess the overall 
structure, logical consistency, and quantity of detail of the statement. Raskin and Esplin 
(1991) assert that the lack of logic and basic details render a statement invalid. A truthful 
account would be more likely to contain large amounts of detail and to be relatively
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unstructured, yet logically consistent. Deceptive accounts are more likely to be highly 
structured, with few details.
Second, there are m or: specific contents that assess such things as contextual 
en adding, interactions between the characters, unusual details, reproductions of speech, 
superfluous details, and subjective experience These contents are in reference to specific 
excerpts of a statement. In general, they are suggestive of the concreteness and vividness 
that are typical of events that have been experienced. Contextual embedding and 
interactions are particularly important because they tend to appear in valid accounts more 
frequently than the others. Contextual embedding refers to descriptions of when and 
where an event occurred. In addition, events do not occur without some relationship to 
other daily routines or circumstances. That is, something happened before the event, and 
something happened afterward. Interactions between the characters refers to a series of 
actions and reactions (three or more) between the characters that are likely to occur in our 
dealings with others. Raskin and Espiin (1991) provided the following excerpt from a 
13-year-old girl's account that is indicative of an interaction: ".. .and then he hit me, and 
then he took my shirt off [actions by the accused], and then I was struggling with him 
[reaction by the witness], and then he unbuttoned my pants [action by the accused], and 
then I tried to kick him away from me [reaction by the witness]" (p. 282).
Other specific contents are expected, but not with as much frequency as those 
noted above. These include: unusual details which refers to items, people or events that 
are meaningful in the context of the entire statement; reproductions of speech wherein part 
of a conversation is reported in its original form; superfluous details or peripheral details
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that are not basic to and do not contribute to the overall event, but which provide support 
for the hypothesis that the recounted events are truthful; and subjective experience which 
refers to the thoughts and feelings that were experienced during the event. While the 
presence of these more specific items lends additional support to the veracity of the 
statement, the absence of these criteria does not necessarily imply fabrication.
In the original formulation of CBCA, several motivational criteria were included in 
a third CBCA category. These criteria included spontaneous corrections, admitting lack 
of memory, and raising doubts about one's own testimony. However, these items might be 
found in both truthful and deceptive statements. Further, these criteria require a certain 
amount of inference about the motivations of the witness Thus, they have been cautiously 
used in discriminations between truthful and false statements (Raskin & Esplin, 1991). 
More recently, only spontaneous corrections and additions have been used in the 
discriminations. The other motivation-related contents have been dropped because of the 
inherent difficulties mentioned above.
There may be limitations to the applicability of CBCA. The general criteria may 
not apply if the event under consideration is short or simple (Raskin & Yuille, 1989). 
Moreover, the criteria may have limited application when the event has repeatedly 
occurred. It has been shown that under circumstances of repeated experience with an 
event, structured accounts may result in adults (Neisser, 1981) and in children (Nelson. 
1988).
Field and laboratory studies have indicated that CBCA is effective in differentiating 
between truthful and fictitious statements. A field study of the validity of CBCA (Esplin,
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Houed, & Raskin, 1988) analyzed 20 confirmed statements and 20 doubtful statements of 
child sexual abuse with CBCA. Their results revealed no overlap between the CBCA 
scores of the confirmed and doubtful groups. They suggested that the results provided 
support for the hypotheses and principles that underlie CBCA.
Further support comes from a recently completed laboratory study which 
investigated the utility of CBCA with child witnesses (Devitt, Honts, Gillund, Amato, 
Peters, & Norton, 1994). The study was a theft simulation in which some of the children 
witnessed the theft of a book which belonged to a student who had been studying in a 
research room. Two groups witnessed a theft: one group saw a research assistant steal 
the book (Researcher As Thief; RAT), the other group witnessed a parent stealing the 
book (Parent As Thief; PAT). Another group of children did not witness a theft, but the 
book disappeared (Parent As Suspect; PAS). The parents were then accused of the theft 
by the owner of the book. The parents in the PAT and PAS groups had earlier been 
instructed to coach their child to accuse the research assistant of the theft. Children were 
then interviewed by a "police officer" (actually a graduate student). The statements that 
were obtained from the children in the study were then analyzed using the CBCA 
procedure. The analysis showed no overlap between the scores of the truthful and 
deceptive groups, and provided support for CBCA as a useful discriminator between real 
and confabulated statements.
The Present Study
The present study investigated the likelihood that people would accept 
misinformation and develop a memory for an event that has never occurred. Subjects
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were presented with descriptions of both real and suggested events. Research assistants 
aided in the development of the real memory descriptions. The suggested memories 
included being lost in a shopping mall and being hospitalized for an ear infection. Subjects 
had either a two day or two week recall period, during which time they kept a diary of 
their memories of each of the events. After the recall period, subjects were interviewed 
about each of the events. Transcripts of the interviews were then analyzed for the extent 
of misinformation acceptance concerning the suggested memories as well as for quantity 
of detail. Subjects were also be asked to provide information about the memorability of 
each the events and to rank how likely it was that each of the events occurred.
Previous research (Belli, 1989; Ceci et al., 1987; Lindsay & Johnson, 1989a,
1989b; Loftus, 1979, Loftus, et al 1978; Morton, Hammersly, & Bekerian, 1985; Tversky 
& Tuchin, 1989) has shown that misinformation acceptance is a rather robust 
phenomenon. Perhaps the phenomenon is much more broad than originally assumed and 
could extend from acceptance of misinformation about details to the acceptance of a 
suggestion and the development of a memory for an event that has never occurred. Thus, 
it was hypothesized that some subjects would develop a memory for the suggested event 
(Loftus has suggested a 20% rate of £ xeptance based on her own work in this area).
Other research has indicated that there are differences between real and imagined 
memories (Johnson, 1988, Johnson & Raye, 1981; Lane, Zaragoza, & Chambers, 1993, 
Schooler et al„ 1986) and truthful and deceptive statements (Raskin & Esplin, 1991) in 
the amount and kinds of detail the memories and statements include. Based on that data, 
it was hypothesized that there would be more details present in memories for real events
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than in the memories for suggested events and the imagined event. Further, it was 
expected that the accounts of the events would contain more detail information after a two 
week recall period than after a two day recall period. Johnson and Suengas (1989) 
reported that rehearsal tends to result in memories with more specific kinds of 
information.
In addition, I expected that subjects who accepted the suggested information 
would rate the memory for the suggested event differently than those who did not develop 
an implanted memory. That is, it was expected that those in the implanted memory group 
would rate the memory for the suggested event as significantly more clear than the those 
who did not develop a memory for a non-event This prediction was based on the 
research on flashbulb memories (e. g., Pillemer, 1984; Rubin & Kozin, 1984) and 
traumatic memories (e. g., Christianson & Loftus, 1987, 1991) which suggest that 
significant or emotional events seem to be remembered with more vivid features than 
mundane events.
Finally, I expected that for the subjects who accepted the suggested memory, the 
suggested memory(ies) would be ranked equally as higher on likelihood of occurrence 
than those who did not develop a memory for the event. That is, if one developed a 
memory for spending a night in the hospital for an ear infection or for being lost in a 




Fifty-two subjects were recruited for participation by undergraduate research 
assistants. Each subject was a first degree relative (parent or an older sibling) of a 
research assistant. Ages of the subjects ranged from fourteen to 2a years of age (M =
18.12, S!D = 2.89). Interviews with the subjects’s parents confirmed that none of the 
subjects had been hospitalized overnight for an ear infection Sixteen of the subjects had 
been 'lost in a shopping mall before the age of eight The remaining 36 subjects had not 
been lost in the shopping mall before the age of eight. There was no selection of subjects 
based on sex. Data from two subjects was discarded for the following reasons: One 
subject in the two suggested memory condition had determined the purpose of the study 
before the debriefing period and the data was not considered. Data from the other subject, 
in the imagined memory condition, was incomplete and therefore not included in this 
study. The final sample contained data from 28 male and 22 female subjects.
Procedure
Potential research assistants were recruited from psychology courses by the 
principal investigator. Potential research assistants were told that the study involved the 
effects of time on childhood memory and that they would be eligible to participate if they 
had a child or younger sibling of at least 14 years of age and if that child or sibling could 
travel to the university on two separate occasions separated by no more than two days or 
two weeks time. The potential research assistants were also told that they would receive
41
42
course credit in exchange for their assistance and participation The potential research 
assistants were then told to contact the principal investigator for more information if they 
were interested in participating in the study When contact by a potential research 
assistant, the principal investigator fully described the study. If the potential research 
assistant continued to be interested in participating, he or she was interviewed by the 
principal investigator to determine if the subject t hey had chosen had met the criteria for 
inclusion in this study That is, the subject could not have been hospitalized for an ear 
infection at any previous time In addition, it was determined whether the subject had 
been lost in a shopping mall before the age of eight Research assistants provided 34 
subjects who had never been lost in a shopping mail and 16 subjects who had been lost in 
a shopping mall before the age of eight (the True Lost group ) The subjects who had 
never been lost were further divided into two groups. One group (the Imagined Lost 
condition) was asked to asked to imagine and develop a convincing story about being lost 
in a shopping mall at the age of six. Each subject in the second group (the Suggested Lost 
group) was led to believe that he or she had been lost in a shopping mall at the age of six 
In both conditions the same information was provided to the subjects in a narrative 
description (see Appendix A). The narrative descriptions provided to subjects in the True 
Lost group varied according to the particular details for each subject An example of a 
narrative description provided to a subject in the True Lost condition is provided in 
Appendix A. Every subject in this study was led to believe that he or she had been 
hospitalized overnight for an ear infection at the age of five However, some subjects had 
been hospitalized at other ages for other reasons.
independent verifications of whether each potential subject had ever been lost in a 
shopping malt of hospitalized overnight for an ear infection were conducted via phone 
calls by the principal investigator to the parent of the subject When that parent was a 
research assistant, phone calls were made to the spouse of the parent who served as 
research assistant As far as could be determined, parents of the 36 subjects in the 
never-lost subjects had no knowledge t hat the subjects had ever been lost All of t he 
parents o f the True Lost group subjects provided verification of t he inciden t
Each of the research assistants recei ved training during t wo sessions. The first 
session included an overview of the study was explained to the research assistant The 
research assistants were told that the study was designed to examine the effects o f time on 
the recall of memories of events experienced during childhood The research assistant 
relatives of the 36 never-lost subjects were asked to recall two incidents that the subject 
had witnessed or experienced during childhood. These research assistants were then told 
that the subject would be exposed to two other incidents that the subject had never 
experienced ; Being lost in a shopping mall at about the age of six and being hospitalized 
overnight for an ear infection at the age of five The research assistant relatives o f the 
remaining 16 subjects who had been lost as children were asked to recount three incidents 
that the subject had witnessed or experienced during childhood, including a brief 
description of the time that the subject was lost in a shopping mal l at some time before the 
age of eight
Research assistants were also told that it was important that they neither prompt 
not coach the subjects in an attempt to enhance recall. The assistants were told that it was
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important that the investigator know how much the subject could recall on his or her own, 
without any aid from others.
The investigator then met with each research assistant a second time the day before 
the subject was scheduled for the initial session. The purpose of this brief meeting was to 
discuss the content o f the incidents and clarify missing information or correct any errors 
that might have occurred during collection of the incidents. At the conclusion of the 
second meeting the principal investigator and the research assistant finalized the 
appointment to meet with the subject and the research assistant for the initial session.
Subjects were randomly assigned to one of the two recall conditions: Twenty-nine 
(58%) of the subjects were assigned to the two day recall condition in which the subject 
tried to remember and kept a daily diary about each of the four events for a two day 
period. These subjects returned to the laboratory for the interview phase sometime on the 
third day after the description of events meeting. The remaining 21 subjects (42%) were 
assigned to the two week recall condition in which the subject tried to remember each of 
the events for a two week period. These subjects were also asked to write in a diary on 
the sixth and 13th day after their initial visit and then returned io the laboratory on the 
14th day after the description of the events meeting.
Each subject was accompanied to the initial meeting by the research assistant to 
whom he or she was related. During this meeting, the subjects were asked to sign a 
consent form (See Appendix B). The objective of the experiment was explained to the 
subjects in the consent form. Subjects were told that the research concerned the effects of 
time on memory and that a family member had provided information about four events
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that had occurred when the subject was younger. Subjects were then told that they would 
be provided with descriptions of those events and that a booklet would be sent home with 
them. Subjects were then instructed on how to fill out the booklet during the recall 
period. They were then told to bring the booklet with them when they returned for their 
second visit. Subjects were also informed that during their final visit to the laboratory, 
they would be asked to recount each of the four events that had been described to them. 
Subjects were then advised that the later meeting would be videotaped and would be used 
for research and training purposes by the principal investigator.
After this introduction, subjects were asked to sign the consent form. When 
subjects were under the age of eighteen, informed consent was obtained from a parent or 
legal guardian. In the case that a subject under the age of eighteen accompanied an older 
sibling to the laboratory, a detailed description of the experiment and a separate consent 
form was given to the parent or legal guardian, was signed by the parent or legal guardian, 
and was received by the investigator before beginning the study (See Appendix C).
After the consent form had been signed, subjects were presented with the narrative 
descriptions of the events. In order to ensure that subjects were not given too much 
information about the events, those descriptions were no longer than about five or six 
sentences in length. At the complet'on of the descriptions, subjects were told that a 
booklet would be sent home with them. They were instructed to write what they were 
able to remember about each of the events. Subjects in the two day recall period wrote 
about their memory for each of the events on both days. Subjects in the two week recall 
period wrote about their memories for the events twice: one week after their initial
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meeting and the day before they returned to the laboratory for the final meeting. Subjects 
were also told that if they could not remember the event that they should write that they 
were unable to remember it. Finally, subjects were told that if they were unable to 
remember any additional information about the event, they should indicate this in the 
booklet. Each subject was supplied with a written list of the descriptions that were read to 
them during the description of events meeting. Before the subject and research assistant 
left the laboratory, an appointment was made for the final visit. Also, at that time, any last 
minute questions were answered.
When a subject returned to the laboratory for the final meeting, he or she was 
greeted by an experienced student interviewer who was blind to the subject's assignment 
to experimental conditions. The interviewer then conducted the interview. The 
interviewer asked the subject to turn in the diary, but the interviewer did not look at the 
diary prior to conducting the interview. Subjects were then asked to read and sign another 
consent form (see Appendix D). That form explained that the purpose of the meeting was 
to recount the events that were introduced during the last meeting. The subject was told 
that he or she would be interviewed by an experienced interviewer. The subject was then 
informed that the interviews were being videotaped and that the videotapes were for use in 
research and training by the principal investigator. The subject was then informed that the 
videotapes would be kept completely confidential in that their names would not be used in 
association with any of the videotaped records . They were told that the audio portion of 
the interviews would be transcribed for analysis and that their names would not be used in 
connection with the transcribed records. When the subjects were minors, informed
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consent was obtained from a parent or legal guardian. After consent was obtained, the 
interview phase began.
To facilitate the process, the interviewer was supplied with appropriate prompts. 
The interviewer began the prompt for each event by saying, "Tell me about the time 
that..." to elicit a free narrative from the subject. After each free narrative period, the 
interviewer asked the subject what additional information the subject wanted to include. If 
the subject reported that he or she was unable to recall any additional information, the 
interviewer moved on to the next event. This procedure was followed for each of the four 
events, To preserve constancy of treatment with each subject, the interviewer did not use 
direct or probing questions during the interview, nor was the subject asked to clarify any 
information that was provided by the subject.
After the conclusion of the interview, subjects were asked to rate the clarity o f 
each of the memories on a seven point Likert-type scale (1 = not at all vivid). Subjects 
were also asked to rate the likelihood that each of the events had occurred, also on a seven 
point Likert-type scale (1 = not at all likely). An example of these follow-up questions are 
provided in Appendix E,
Subjects were then thoroughly debriefed about the nature of the study. All 
subjects were informed that they had never been hospitalized overnight for an ear 
infection. The 18 subjects who were also in the implanted memory condition for being 
lost in a shopping mall were inform.d that the event had never occurred. Subjects were 
told that the purpose of the inclusion of such an event (s) description was to determine the 
effects on subsequent memory for the event(s) The principal investigator then provided
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relevant information from previous case studies reported by Loftus and Coan (in press), 
whose case studies have suggested that memories may be implanted through the use of a 
paradigm similar to the paradigm used for this study. Subjects were encouraged to ask 
questions during the debriefing period. At such a time as the subject had no further 
questions and was comfortable with the explanations provided by the principal 
investigator, he or she was dismissed.
The audiotaped records were then transcribed. After the transcription phase was 
completed, the records were analyzed and tallies were made of the occurrence of an 
implanted memory of being lost in a shopping mall for those subjects who had not truly 
experienced the event at the age of five. In addition, tallies were made for the 
implantation of a memory of being hospitalized overnight for an ear infection in ah 
subjects.
The transcripts were then analyzed for overall number of words uttered by subjects 
during the interview. The transcripts were also analyzed for detail. Comparisons were 
then made between quantity of detail (as indicated by word counts) present in the records 
of the events of interest — being lost in a shopping mall — for those subjects in the real 
memory condition, the suggested memory' condition, and the imagined memory condition. 
Comparisons were also made between those interviews that were conducted with subjects 
after two days of recall and those conducted after a two week recall period. Finally, 
comparisons were made in clarity and likelihood of occurrence ratings reported by 
subjects for each of the events
RESULTS
Fa; Reports
The transcripts were analyzed and tallies collected for the number of subjects in the 
Suggested Lost condition in whom a false report of being lost in a shopping mall was 
noted. One subject (5.56%) recounted being lost in a mall at the age of six, when there 
was no verification from that subject's parents that the event had occurred. Moreover, 
some of the details that had been provided during the initial meeting were presented in the 
subject’s description of this event. It was believed that this represented an implanted 
memory, or a false report, for an event that had never occurred. Three other subjects 
(16.67%) provided descriptions of having been lost as a child that were very different in 
their details from the information that had been provided in the initial narrative description. 
In discussing this further with the subjects and their parents, no verifications that the 
subjects had indeed been lost were obtained. However, the information provided by these 
three subjects was sufficiently different from the suggested memory as to question the 
possibility that these were implanted memories, or at least false reports.
Further analysis of the transcribed records revealed that three subjects (18.75%) in 
the True Lost condition had not been hospitalized for any reason as a child, but appeared 
to have given a partial false report (representing a possible partial implantation) about the 
event based on either the stethoscope or the watch. Two other subjects (12.50%) in this 
condition had been hospitalized for reasons other than an ear infection, and both subjects 
provided descriptions of an event they had experienced. In addition, one of those subjects
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provided information about a nurse who had given the subject a watch and that the watch 
seemed to calm down the subject. This may represent a blending of new, but incorrect, 
information with a past memory.
One subject (5.56%) in the Suggested Lost condition falsely reported (representing 
a possible implantation) spending a night in the hospital for an ear infection. Three other 
subjects (18.75%) had been hospitalized for other reasons during childhood, but they did 
not blend in any of the new, but incorrect, information concerning the ear infection or 
other details included in the stimulus description. The remaining subjects (77.78%) in this 
condition claimed they did not remember a time when they had been hospitalized 
overnight for an ear infection.
Table 1.
Mean Number of Words Uttered and Mean Flesch Reading Ease Grade Level fPREGL) 











Overall, in the True Lost group, five (32.25%) of the subjects did not remember
the time when they had been lost as a child. The remaining 11 subjects (68.75%) provided
descriptions that were consistent with the description that had been provided during the 
initial meeting. All of the subjects in the Imagined Lost condition provided some 
information abor t having been lost in a shopping mall at the age of six. However, the 
majority of those descriptions were rather lacking in detail.
Table 2.
Mean and Standard Deviation Values of Number of Words Uttered (NWU) About Being 
Lost and Being Hospitalized by Group.
Group
NWU Overall True Imagined Suggested
Lost
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M 227.56 261.12 278.44 152.5
SD 303.41 213.58 259.64 395.16
Hospital1
M 114.86 142.69 98.75 104.44
SD 162.26 231.97 109.83 129.13
Rating Scale Data
Level of discourse was examined using the Flesch Index. The subjects' utterances 
were subjected to a grammar check available on the AmiPro (Lotus Development 
Corporation, 1993) word processing program. Results revealed the number of words 
uttered during the interview and the Flesch Reading Ease Grade Level Index (FREGL, 
Flesch, 1948). Table I shows the means and standard deviations of the grammatical 
analysis. Overall, the mean number of words uttered (NWU) by subjects for all four 
events was 1,090 words (SD = 918.70) with a range from 189 to 3,977 words during the
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interview process. The Fiesch Index revealed a mean Reading Ease Grade Level of 6.33 
(SD ** 0,41) v/ith a range from grade 5.60 to 7.50.
The NWU data were then subjected to a one-way Analysis of Variance (ANOVA) 
The ANOVA revealed no significant differences between Groups, F(2, 47) * 0.889, g > 
.05. A one-way ANOVA of the FREGL data also failed to reveal a significant difference
between Groups, F(2, 47) = 0.031, g > .05. 
Table 3.



























Quantity of detail (as indicated by word counts) were examined with an ANOVA 
between the three groups for the events of interest (lost in a shopping mall, spending a 
night in the hospital). No significant differences between groups were revealed, [F(2, 47) 
= 0.889, g > .05. The means and standard deviations from this analysis are shown in
Independent groups t-tests were then conducted on Number of Words Uttered by subjects 
during the two day condition and the 14 day condition The analysis failed to reveal 
significant effects of time, t{48) = 0.10, p > .05. Table 3 show the means and standard 
deviations from that analysis.
Table 4.
Mean Ratings of Clarity of Memory for Being Lost.
Group
Time Overall True Imagined Suggested
T wo Day
n 29 9 8 12
M 3.21 3.33 4.13 2.5
S D 2.37 2.18 2.7 2.24
Two Week
n 21 7 8 6
M 2.38 2.86 1.42 1
SD 1.99 2.61 0.5 0
Means and standard deviations for the subjects’ ratings of the clarity of the memory 
of the events of interest (lost in a shopping mall and spending a night in the hospital) are 
shown in Table 4. Mean and standard deviation values for subjects' clarity ratings for 
spending a night in the hospital are shown in Table 5.
The Lost in the Mali clarity data were then subjected to a 3 (Groups) X 2 (Time) 
ANOVA. The main effects of Group [F(2, 44) -  3.01, MSE = 14.16] and Time [F(l, 44) 
= 2.175, MSE = 12.76] failed to reach significance. The Group by Time interaction [F(2, 
44) = 0.23, MSE = 1.06] also failed to reach significance. The clarity of memory for the
Night in the Hospital data were also subjected to a between-subjects 3 (Groups) X 2 
(Time) ANOVA. There were no significant main effects of Group [F(2, 44) ** I 22, MSB 
-  0.092} or Time [F( i, 44) = 0.17, MSB •  0.13}, nor was there a significant Group by 
Time interaction [F(2, 44) * 0.94, MSE * 0.71}
Table 5.
Mean Ratings of Clarity of Memory for Being Hospitalized
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Group
Time Overall True Imagined Suggested
Two Day
n 29 9 8 12
M 1.41 1.44 1.38 I 42
SD
Two Week
0.83 0.88 0 52 0.99
n 21 7 8 6
M 1.48 1.7! 1 1.83
SD 0.93 0.95 0 1.33
Table 6.




Overall True Imagined Suggested
n 29 9 8 12
M 3.83 5.33 2.63 3.5
SD 2.65 2.18 2.72 2.58
Two Week 
n 21 7 8 6
M 3.76 5.29 3.7S 2
s q 2.53 1.89 3.0! 1.27
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Subjects’ ratings of the likelihood of occurrence of the lost and hospital events 
were also examined Mean and standard deviation values for t he likelihood of occurrence 
or being tost in a shopping mail and being hospitalized overnight for an ear infection are 
shown in Table 6 and Table 7, respectively
The Lost in the Mall likelihood data were subjected to a 3 (Group) X 2 (Time) 
between-subjects ANOVA. There was a significant effect of Group on subjects' report s o f 
the likelihood of having been lost in a shopping mall, F(2, 44) = 5 106, p < 05 There was 
no significant main effect of Time [F(I, 44) » 0 04, M.SE -  0.24] nor was there a Group 
by Time interaction {F(2, 44) « I (9, MSB » 6 92}
Table 7.
Subjects' Mean Ratines of Likelihood of Occurrence of Being Hospitalized
Group
Time Overall True Imagined Suggested
Two Day
n 29 9 8 12
M 2.59 2.44 263 2.67
SD L84 1 59 L69 2.23
Two Week
n 21 7 8 6
M 2.81 3 29 2 3.33
SD 2.02 3.29 I 98 1.97
The Night in the Hospital data were then subjected to a 3 (Group) X 2 (Time) 
ANOVA. There were no significant main effects o f Group [F(2, 44) = 0.56, MSB *  2.12]
or Time (EC l» 44} *  0,27, MSB •* f ,03] nor was ifaere a significant interaction effect o f 
Group by Time (0 2 , 4 4 }*  0.67. MUB -2 ,5 6 1
The Clarity data from ilm subjects who | w  a. report §>r being ftospiiatmxf
(False Report group) were tbm subjected to a series of independent groups t-tests. A 
significant difference «t clarity ratings between tie False. Report group (M ®- 2.40,. fH| **
0.89} and tie  True Lost group {§$ *  L38, $B *  0.65) was noted, t{!6) «  2 68* p < M  A 
significant difference between the False Report group (M m 1 40. SD »  0.f t )  and t ie  
Imagined Memory group IM ®! I 11,. §>  *  wm  a te  noted. If I?) «■ 4,49, p < ..05..
However, no significant difference was noted between lire Fate Report group (M * 2.40, 
SO *  0 89) and tie  Suggested Memory group CM'» I ..53, fgf> »■ I f 8), f{26> » t. 52, g >
. 05. Because only one. subject ted developed a. fat*, report; o f being lost, m a stepping 
mail, no analyses were conducted to test differences in clarity ratings.
DISCUSSION
The results of the current study suggest that it may be possible to implant a 
memory for an event that has never occurred Overall, six subjects were affected by the 
suggestions provided during the initial meeting. In five of those subjects, there was 
evidence for false reports about spending a night in the hospital for an ear infection. In 
addition, there was a further false report about being lost in a shopping mall in one subject.
It is interest ng that the length of delay between the initial and follow-up visit did 
not affect the likelihood that subjects would falsely report a fictitious event. Why did the 
subjects remember something that never happened? The cognition literature suggests that 
the act o f imagining can lead to a greater feeling of familiarity and, thus, to the belief that 
it is a memory of an actual memory rather than somet hing that might have been imagined 
(e. g., Johnson & Raye, 1981). There may have been a break-down in reality monitoring 
in that subjects may no longer be able to differentiate between something they had 
imagined and a veridical memory. In addition, in their review of the cognition and 
memory suggestibility literature, Lindsay and Read (in press) reported that prior research 
suggests a number o f factors that may lead to confusions and errors in memory. Among 
those factors are the temporal degradation of the original memory, the inherent 
vulnerability o f recollections o f childhood experiences to reality monitoring confusions and 
misleading suggestions, the apparent authority o f the source of the suggestion, and the 
suggestion's plausibility. They also report that rehearsal of the suggested information may 
lead to perceived similarities o f imagined and real events and, thus, to the acceptance of an
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imagined event as something truly experienced It is possible that any or all o f these 
factors may have Contributed Id the false reports of some subjects in this study
Alternatively, it is possible that the subjects who remembered the suggested events 
may have heard a story about or known someone who had experienced a simitar incident. 
A personal anecdote may be illustrative at this point My oldest daughter served as an 
eyewitness in a court o f law when she was quite young. Because this incident has been 
discussed frequently in our home, my youngest daughter has come to believe that she had 
also experienced the event. It appears that my youngest daughter has developed a 
memory for an event that never occurred. The same may be true for subjects in this study 
They may have come to incorporate the event in their personal memory because of 
knowledge about someone else's experience.
Another explanation may involve personal, schematized knowledge That is, 
subjects may have accepted the suggestion that they had been hospitalized tor an ear 
infection if they had experienced an ear infection at some point in their childhood, in 
addition, it is possible that subjects may have accepted the suggestion as a result o f having 
visited a hospital at some point in their childhood This, of course, relates to the 
plausibility of the suggestion, it is also suggestive of the effect that schematic knowledge 
could potentially have on the development o f a false report about a fictitious event i f  one 
knows what an ear infection is like, or what a hospital is like, then further consideration of 
the  suggested event is possible,
In this study, over all subjects, there w ars no statist iaally aignifivam diffefenee# in 
the  clarity o f  the memory for the suggested m emories Mowever, only 12% Of the subjects
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came to falsely report an event When clarity ratings of those subjects from whom a false 
report about spending a night in a hospital was noted were compared with subjects who 
had not accepted the suggestion, a statistical!} significant difference emerged with the 
false report "memories" being reported as having gi eater clarity This result is consistent 
with reality monitoring and characteristics associated with real and imagined events (e. g., 
Johnson, Foley, & Leach, 1988). That is, rehearsal o f the perceptual aspects o f a 
suggested situation may result in difficulty in discriminating the difference between the 
suggested and the real events.
The paucity o f words uttered by the subjects about all o f  the events posed a 
problem in this study. The event descriptions provided by subjects during the interview 
were not rich in details or contextual cues in any of the conditions. In order that the 
interviews be as consistent as possible between multiple interviewers, subjects were not 
questioned about items specific to any o f the events. Moreover, the cues were chosen in 
an attempt to eliminate the potential for a self-fulfilling prophecy (Snyder, 1984). Direct 
questions might have contributed to lengthening the interviews, but may also have affected 
what the subjects tru ly remembered about each o f the events. The cues provided to t he 
subjects were very neutral and may not have evoked the same type of responses that more 
direct questions might elicit Furthermore, the student interviewers in this study were 
blind with respect to the condition to which each subject was assigned. While a pattern 
obviously emerged over time, the interviewer was never certain if, for example, a subject's 
memory of being lost in a shopping mall was real, imagined, or suggested
60
Based on preliminary results from Loftus's laboratory, it was anticipated that the 
implantation rate would approach approximately 20%, based on preliminary results from 
Loftus's laboratory. The results o f this study revealed a rate o f implantation of 12%, 
somewhat lower than expected, but probably within the range of results expected in a 
r eplication. However, there may be a number of underlying cause for t his difference in 
rates o f implantatton Loftus used more prompts with her subjects. In addition, her 
research has required subjects to recount the event on more than one occasion In the 
current study, subjects were told that it was "all right if you do not remember the events 
that were described because sometimes our memories fade." This statement represents a 
more innocuous and benign method o f suggestion, Because repeated exposure may lead 
to a feeling of familiarity and likelihood, it may contribute to Loftus’s higher rate o f 
successful implantation. Alternatively, in their historical review of children's suggestibility, 
Ceei and Bruck (1993) posit that children who are repeatedly subjected to the same 
question may feel they have not given the right answer the first time and try a new 
approach in an attempt to be a good conversational partner This may also be the ease 
with the subjects in the Loftus study If after being repeatedly quest ioned about an event 
that one does not remember, one might suppress the original response, substituting if with 
a new response that may be perceived as more satisfactory to the interviewer
Loftus has suggested that memory implantation procedures should be successful 
about 20% o f  the time. The present study successfully implanted memories in 6 o f the 50 
subjects (12%) Is this result within the range of results that might be expected if Loftus's 
expectations were correct? To answer this question, a series of 14,500 monte carlo
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simulations was conducted to estimate the range of replication results. I t was determined
/
that the six successfully implanted memory cases fell within the 90% confidence interval 
for a replication, suggesting that it is likely that the six successful implantations (false 
reports) reported here indicate a replication of the Loftus results
While this study did not the investigate the effects o f personality factors in the 
likelihood of developing a false memory, future research might incorporate such measures. 
Creative individuals are highly imaginative and. as such, may be more susceptible to the 
effects of suggestion because they may be more likely to attempt to visualize the scenario 
A histrionic individual may develop a false report because of some need for attention. In 
addition, individuals highly susceptible to hypnosis and its resulting altered state o f 
consciousness may be more susceptible to the effects o f suggestion
Another interesting result was that a few subjects in the Suggested Last group 
reported having been lost in a shopping mall in the absence o f any supporting evidence. 
Parents o f these subjects were unaware that their children had ever been lost or separated 
from the family at any time during childhood. There are several possible explanations. 
First, perhaps these memories may be spontaneously existing false memories. That is, the 
memory for the event may be false, but the subject has come to believe it and the memory 
has become more elaborate over time This contention is supported by the work of 
Johnson and her colleagues <e g , Foley & Johnson, 1985, Johnson, Foley, Suengas, and 
Raye, 1988; Lindsay, Johnson, & K won, 1991). The bulk of that research suggests that 
confusions of real and imagined events are likely if the memories in questions were formed 
during childhood One would be more likely to continue to believe that ait event is true as
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an adult if the imagined event concerns some instance front childhood Second, the 
parents of some subjects may have been untruthful in revealing that their child had been 
lost in a shoppi ng mall because o f embarrassment
Third, these subjects may have been truly lost as a child but neglected to mention 
the incident to their parents Another personal anecdote may be illustrative At the age of 
six, 1 accompanied my family on a vacation to the Black Hills o f South Dakota During a 
visit to Mount Rushmore. we stepped into a gift shop I was fascinated by the wonderful 
array of gift items and, u nbek nownst to me, lost t rack o f my family members I reached 
over toward the man stand' ig  beside me and wrapped my arms around his waist I had 
assumed that man was my father When l did so, I was horror-stricken to discover that 
man was a .stranger, not my father at all, I looked around in a state of panic . Relief came 
soon afterwards when I spotted my parents outside in the parking lot. My family had not 
yet realized that I was not with them 1 never told my parents because o f my fear and my 
embarrassment In fact, I did not mention the episode until some years later My parents 
did not realize 1 was missing, and I did not tell them, but it makes the incident no less 
likely to have occurred , at feast in my own mind
Fourth, the subjects m  this study may have been lost and then told their parents, 
but the parents do not remember because of normal forgetting That is, the parents may 
not have been overly concerned about the child's experience because all turned out well, 
Moreover, the event may have lacked any emotional sabency that may have caused it to be
more memorable,
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Fifth, and finally, there is the potential that the memories reported by these few 
subjects represent a successful and complete implantation of a false memory, but one 
which contains none o f the suggested details. The information included by these subjects 
during the interview was far different from the details included in the suggested 
description o f being lost in a shopping mall Because of these essential differences, I did 
not believe they constituted an implanted memory due to the effects of suggestion during 
the initial session and, for that reason, they were not reported as successfully implanted 
memories. However, if these memories do represent a successful implantation, they 
would lend further support to the idea that suggested memories may be accepted as fact 
by some subjects, and, in fact, may be highly different from that which was suggested.
Some subjects did not have any memory for an event that had occurred, namely 
being lost in a shopping mall One possible explanation tor this finding is that the subjects 
may have experienced childhood or infantile amnesia. Often we do not remember what we 
experienced before the age o f two or three, and some research (e g , Usher & Neisser,
1993 ) suggests that we remember no more t han scattered bi ts o f childhood experiences 
until the ages o f five or six. A second explanation centers around interpretation of the 
event For example, if a child is separated from parents during a trip to the shopping mall, 
it may be intentional on the part o f the child When the parents realize that the child is 
missing, they may believe that the child is lost The child, on the other hand, may feel that 
it was the parents who were lost, or the child may have been unconcerned because o f they 
were otherwise occupied with the mtwesfing: sights at the mall These differences in
64
labeling the situation may lead a parent to remember the incident while the child does not, 
and may explain lack o f memory for such an event
Another subject had been hospitalized for a reason other than an ear infection 
during childhood. When she was given the suggestion that she had been hospitalized for 
an ear infection, some confusion ensued . This subject described her memory o f her 
hospitalization, but also included a detail presented in the suggested description: She 
remembered the watch and reported that the w at'h helped her to relax a bit Moreover, 
the subject remembered that it was a gold watch (the color o f the watch was never 
mentioned in the description). This subject's parents reported that she had been 
hospitalized as a child For that reason I did no* consider this subject’* responses to be a 
false report for the hospitalization suggestion Instead this subject's response may 
represent a blending of incorrect information with a memory for a real event, or 
misinformation acceptance.
It is possible that the results reported here are due to the effects o f suggestion and 
the fallibility o f memorial processes However, 1 must add one caveat to the 
interpretations reported here It is possible that these results may be due to the effects of 
experimenter expectancy and experimenter bias, as well as demand characteristics. Some 
subjects may want to please the investigator and unwittingly provide the requested, hut 
false, information. Moreover, this line o f research may be subject to the "confirmatory 
bias" mentioned in Loftos (l dc)3 ) If c ue searches and probes often enough and deeply 
enough, one may find that for which one looks Perhaps experimenters subtly reinforce 
the “correct" fictitious answer. I f that is the case, subjects may be affected by the
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reinforcement and develop a memory for a suggested event, or at least provide the 
experimenter with information that fits with expectation.
Confirmatory bias affects not only the experimenter, but perhaps the subjects as 
well Once an image of a suggested event has been created, one is much more likely to 
search for other supporting details that might substantiate the event. We tend to attribute 
more weight to information that confirms our hypotheses than to information that 
disconfirms (Snyder, 1984). Bias o f this type may lead to overestimations o f the true 
frequency with which events are naturally related This bias was labeled the illusory 
correlation (e. g , Chapman & Chapman, 1969; Tversky & Kahneman, 1974). Tversky 
and Kahneman suggest that these illusory correlations may obscure the true relationship 
between events, resulting in systematic confirmatory errors. These errors may then enable 
the acceptance of a memory for an event that was merely suggested and has no basis in 
veridicality,
The factors that may have led to the development and acceptance o f  a suggested 
event for the subjects in this study are conjecture on my part. However, the factors I have 
mentioned thus far are much the same as those typically overlooked by therapists in 
clinical practice (Lindsay &  Read, in press; Loftus, 1993) who attempt to recover 
repressed memories o f childhood abuse While this study was not designed to mimic a 
therapy sotting, nor were the suggestions as serious as those associated with abuse, the 
results reported here have implications for practitioners
First, the results o f this study suggest that without any overt pressure to remember 
the mentioned events, some subjects were still affected by the suggestive material.
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Perhaps with more force and repeated exposure to the mate ial, one may be even more 
likely to be affected by the suggestions. Second, those subjects who falsely reported a 
fictitious event appear to have done so quickly, and the reports for the non-event, while 
not always well-defined, included the details that were mentioned during the initial 
meeting. Third, it is possible that what is imagined about some suggested event may come 
to be considered z real memory by some subjects If that is the case, caution is necessary 
when attempting to make a clinical diagnosis. If one is unaware of, or pays no attention 
to, the ways in which memory is fallible, one may uncritically accept recovered memories 
as veridical, in spite o f evidence that suggests that illusory memories may exist.
APPENDICES
APPENDIX A
SUGGESTED EVENTS DESCRIPTIONS 
Night in the Hospital Example.
I remember you were about 5. You had not been feeling well from a cold or 
something. One night you were crying, saying your ear hurt really bad We took you to 
the emergency room. Then we had to take you to the hospital to spend the night because 
your ear infection was so bad. There was a nurse there with a stethoscope draped around 
her neck. She had this watch on that you thought was really neat. She let you keep it to 
look at it until you calmed down 
Lost in the Mall Example.
You were 6. We had gone shopping at the mall. After some panic, we found you 
being led down the mall by a tall, older man (I think he was wearing a flannel shirt) You 
were crying and holding the man's hand. The man explained that he had found you 
walking around crying your eyes out just a few moments before and was trying to help 
you And your parents.
APPENDIX B
PARENTAL CONSENT FORM
THE EFFECTS OF TIME AND MISINFORMATION ON MEMORY
FOR COMPLETE EVENT
Dear Parents,
I am conducting a study which I hope will be o f aid in understanding the effects of 
time and suggestion on memory for events. It has been established that we do not 
normally remember events exactly as they have occurred. Instead we tend to reconstruct 
events if there are things that we do not remember. As a result, it is unlikely that 
memories are exact. People are more likely to remember the spirit o f the situation, but not 
peripheral details. People are often unable to recall details, especially over time.
Moreover, when details are recalled, they are often incorrect. Furthermore, it has been 
demonstrated that memory is often affected by suggestive questions. People are inclined 
to incorporate misleading information into their memory for events. Elizabeth Loftus, 
from the University o f Washington in Seattle, has conducted research that revealed the 
misinformation effect. That is, those who have been exposed to erroneous information 
show some deficits in memory performance. Memory distortions have been found to exist 
in a variety of settings. People have recalled seeing nonexistent items, such as broken 
glass, and have recalled inaccurate characteristics for items they did see, such as 
substituting a stop sign for a yield sign
Recent anecdotal information has suggested that people may be influenced by 
information to such an extent that they may develop memories for complete events that
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have never occurred. This study will investigate the effects o f time and suggestion for the
recall of real and suggested events. Should you agree to allow your child to participate in
this research, here is what will happen:
R E S E A R C H  P R O T O C O L
Ninety research assistant-students will be obtained through the use o f the 
University o f North Dakota subject pool. Those individuals who want to be research 
assistants will be interviewed by the principal investigator The potential research 
assistant-students must have a son or daughter, or a same-age or younger sibling who is 
fourteen years of age or older. The interviews with the principal investigator will be used 
to determine whether the child/sibling subject the research assistant-student has chosen 
meets the criteria for inclusion in this study. To test the notion that it is possible to 
develop complete memories for an event that has never occurred, tv/o manipulations will 
be conducted. One manipulation centers around being lost in a shopping mall at about age 
six. The other manipulation centers around being hospitalized overnight for an ear 
infection at about age five. Sixty research assistant-students will provide subjects who 
have never been lost in a shopping mall. The remaining 30 research assistants will provide 
subjects who were lost in a shopping mall before the age of eight. Independent 
verifications o f whether each potential subject has ever been lost in a shopping mall or 
hospitalized for an ear infection will be conducted by the principal investigator via phone 
calls to the parent of the subject or, in the event that a parent is a research assistant, to that 
person's spouse. The remaining 60 subjects will be randomly assigned to one o f two 
groups. One group of 30 subjects will serve as the suggested memory group. These
subjects will be led to believe, through suggestion, that they had been lost in a shopping 
mall at about the age of six, The other group of 30 Subjects will be told to make up a 
convincing story about being lost in a shopping mal l at about the age o f six All subjects 
will be led to believe, also through suggestion, that they were hospitalized overnight for an 
ear infection at about the age of fi ve,
Research assistant-students will initially be trained by the principal investigator.
The training will an initial meeting with the investigator during which a
description of the study will be provided. Each research assistant-student will be told that 
the study is designed to examine the effects of time and suggestion on the recall o f 
memories of events experienced during childhood Sixty research assistants will be asked 
to recall two salient incidents that the subject had experienced during childhood These 
research assistants will then be told that the subject will be exposed to two additional 
incidents that the subject has never experienced being lost in a shopping mall at the age 
o f six, and being hospitalized for an ear infection at the age of five, The remaining thirty 
research assistants will be asked to recall three incidents that the subject had witnessed 
during childhood, including a brief description o f the time that the subject was lost in a 
shopping mall at the age o f five. These 30 assistants will then be told that the subject will 
be exposed to an additional incident: being hospitalized for an ear infection at the age of 
five. Each meeting will be audiotaped to record the content o f the events that the research 
assistant reports
Although the research assistant-students will have full prior knowledge of the true 
nature o f the research, they will be asked to withhold the purpose of t he study from t he
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subjects prior to their participation. The fact that this deception is necessary for the goals / 
ot this study will be discussed with the assistant-students. The principal investigator will 
explain to the research assistants the importance of not prompting or coaching the subject 
in an attempt to enhance recall The student assistants will be told that it is important that 
the investigator know how much the subject can recall on his or her own, without any aid 
from others.
The investigator will then meet with the research assistant a second time to discuss 
the content o f the incidents and clarify missing information or correct any errors that may 
have occurred during the transcription of the records o f the first meeting. Any questions 
or concerns the research assistant has will be addressed at this time At the conclusion of 
the second meeting the investigator will arrange for a time to meet with the subject and 
the research assistant to introduce the experimental manipulations.
Each subject will be accompanied to the meeting by the research assistant to whom 
he or she is related During this meeting, the objective o f the experiment will be explained 
to the subjects by the principal investigator and in the consent form. After this 
introductory statement of purpose, subjects will be asked to sign a consent form Subjects 
under the age of eighteen must receive informed consent of a parent or legal guardian. In 
the case that a subject under the age o f eighteen accompanies an older sibling to the 
laboratory, a detailed description of the experiment and a separate consent form will be 
given to the parent or legal guardian and this consent will be received by the investigator 
before beginning the study.
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After the consent form has been signed, subjects will be read the descriptions o f 
the events. The descriptions will be about five or six sentences in length This will ensure 
that subjects are not given too much information about the events The order o f the 
presentation of the events will be as follows: First, they will receive information about 
one o f the real events; second, about being lost in a shopping mall at about age six. third, 
about being hospitalized overnight for ear infection; and fourth, about the other real 
event At the completion of the descriptions, subjects will be told that a booklet will be 
sent home with them in which they will write, during the experimental period, what they 
are able to remember about each of the events. Subjects will also be told that if they 
cannot remember the event that they should write that they are unable to remember it 
Finally, subjects will be told t hat if they are unable to remember additional information 
about the event, they should indicate this in the booklet The related research assistant 
will contact the subject each day to remind him or her to fill out the diary.
Subjects will then be randomly assigned to one o f  two recall conditions. Forty-five 
(45) o f the subjects will be assigned to the two day condition in which the subject will try 
to remember and will keep a daily diary about each o f the events for a two day period 
These Subjects will return to the laboratory for the interview phase sometime on the third 
day after the description of events meeting The remaining 45 subjects will be assigned to 
the two week condition in which the subject will try to remember and will keep a daily 
diary about each o f  the events each day for a two week period. These subjects will return 
to the laboratory sometime on the fifteenth day after the description o f the events meeting 
Subjects will be instructed to bring the booklet to the laboratory when they return for the
final phase of the study Before the subject and research assistant leave the laboratory, an 
appointment will be made for the final visit Also, at this time, any last minute questions 
will be answered.
When the subject returns to the laboratory for the final meeting, he or she will be 
greeted by a experienced interviewer who is blind to the conditions (real versus implanted 
memory for being lost in a shopping mall at the age of five, and two days versus two 
weeks for recall) to which the subject is assigned and who will conduct the interviews with 
the subject. The interviewer will ask each o f the subjects to turn in the daily diary, but the 
interviewer will not examine the diary prior to the interview Subjects will be told that the 
daily diaries are for use only by the principal investigator for research and training 
purposes and will be kept completely confidential and will not be associated with their 
names in any way.
Subjects will then be asked to read and sign another consent form which explains 
that the purpose of t he meeting is to recount the events that were introduced during their 
last meeting in the laboratory. Subjects will be told that they will be interviewed by an 
experienced interviewer. Subjects will be informed that the interviews will be videotaped 
and that the videotapes are for use only by the principal investigator for the purposes o f 
research and training. Subjects will then be informed that the videotapes will be kept 
completely confidential and that their names will not be used in association with any of the 
videotaped records They will be told that the audio portion of the videotaped interviews 




Subjects who are minors will receive informed consent from a parent or legal 
guardian An individual consent form will be sent to the parent o f minor subject and will 
be returned before the final phase o f the study is conducted After subjects have read and 
signed the consent form, the interview phase will begin. The interviewer will be supplied 
with appropriate prompts that will facilitate the interview. Interviewers will begin the 
prompt for each event by saying, "Tell me about the time t h a t I t  is expected that a free 
narrative by the subject will be elicited through the use o f this statement. After each free 
narrative period, the interviewer will ask the subject what additional information the 
subject may want to include. If the subject reports that he or she is unable to recall any 
additional information, the interviewer will move on to the next event This procedure 
will be followed for each of the four events. After the interview has concluded, the 
subject will be asked to  rate the vi vidness o f each of the memories on a seven point 
Likert-type scale (1 *  not at all vivid) Finally, subjects will be asked to decide which of 
the four events they feel did not occur and will rate their confidence in the validity o f each 
memory on a seven point scale (1 - not a true memory)
Subjects will then be thoroughly debriefed about the nature of the study Those 
subjects who had never been lost in a shopping mall will be informed that the event did not 
occur. AM subjects will be informed that the hosphahmtlon for an ear infection did not 
occur. Subjects will be told that the purpose of the inclusion of such events was to 
determine the effects suggestion has on subseftueni memory for events The principal 
investigator will then provide relevant information from previous case studies reported by 
Loftus (1993) Her anecdotal reports suggest that memories may be implanted through
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the use of a paradigm similar to the paradigm used for this study Subjects will be
encouraged to asfc questions during the debriefing period At such a time as the subject
has no further questions and is comfortable with the explanations provided by the principal
investigator, he or she will be dismissed
Each research assistant-student who meets the above criteria and agrees to
participate will receive 1 credit that may be applied toward graduation requirements in the
course Psychology 491, "Individual Projects in Psychology". Course credit is being
offered because of the time commitment that will be required of the research
assistant-students It is estimated that each assistant will spend between 10 and 15 hours
in direct involvement with this project and with his or her subject 
B E N E F IT S  A S S O C IA T E D  W IT H  P A R T IC IP A T IO N
Benefits to both the individual and society are expected to be obtained from this
study Individual participants will benefit from learning about the potential effects of
suggestion on memory for events. In addition, subjects will learn about the research
process and the manner by which investigations into memory processes are conducted
Subjects will become better informed about the issues o f false and repressed memory .
Benefits to the field o f  psychology include a better understanding o f  the effect s o f
time and suggestion on memory Previous research has shown that memory for events is
affected by postevent information, and that misleading information can change what one
remembers about witnessed events. This research should add significantly to the available
literature on the suggestibility o f memory
77
Benefits to society include the implications this research may hold for the current
controversy over repressed and false memory This research will have implications for
policy makers who are cmsidering altering statures o f limitations to accommodate the
recovery o f repressed memory. Marty psychologists currently believe that there is m  such
thing as repressed memory and that persons who report such memories are displaying the
effects of memory implantation. This research directly addresses the possibility that such
false memories can be created
RISKS INVOLVED W ITH THIS STUDY
Subjects will not be given advance information about the true purpose o f this
study, although their related research assistant will This research deception is necessary 
to simulate conditions under which humans attempt to recall events from their past. The 
external validity or generalizability o f my results requires that subjects be u naware o f the 
deception that will be employed. At t he conclusion of the study, the subjects will be 
extensively debriefed They will be told which o f the events were not true along with the 
reason for including such events as part of the research protocol The suggestible nature 
of memory will be di scussed a long wi th the reasons u nderly ing t he necessity o f the 
deception.
Parents will be fully informed o f the research protocol and the potential risks that 
may arise from their child's participation; in this study Parents will be informed that their 
child may Subjects will be free to dke> mtinue their participation at any time they may foe) 
uncomfortable without jeopardizing tfeetr relationship with the investigator or the 
University o f North D akota In addhdwv, the subject's right to terminate participation
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without penalty will be verbally reinforced during each visit the subject makes to the 
laboratory.
Some subjects may feel embarrassed or uneasy about recalling events from their 
past. However, this is not expected to cause any long-term detrimental effects to the 
subject. Moreover, the research assistant-students will be told that the events the subject 
writes or is interviewed about should not be o f a highly personal, sensitive nature.
Upon learning about the true purpose o f the study, it is possible that some subjects 
may experience a sense o f embarrassment resulting from developing a memory for an 
event that had never occurred However, it is expected that the debriefing process will 
relieve that discomfort Subjects will be informed of other anecdotal reports t hat 
indicated that others have also developed memories for fictitious events In addition, to 
reduce this potential embarrassment, identifying names wit! not be used in connection with 
any o f  the daily diaries or the transcripts All data collected will be assigned random 
numbers for coding purposes, and only group responses will be used in published reports 
of this study. Furthermore, all videotapes, audiotapes, transcripts, and daily diaries 
generated from this study will be kept in the principal investigator’s locked office
Because of the deception utilized for this study, some subjects may feel angry with 
the related research assistant for revealing personal information to ft stranger However, 
it is anticipated that the events to be recalled would be similar to those that the family 
members might share with each other during family get-togethers In addition, subjects 
will be assured that their interviews will remain confidential and that names will not be 
associated in any way with the collected data
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Your decision to participate or not participate in this research will not prejudice 
your future relations with the University o f North Dakota or the Psychology Department 
If  you decide to allow your child to participate, you and your child are free to discontinue 
participation at any time without prejudice. Any information, including the videotapes, 
audiotapes, and written records, obtained from this research will remain in coded form, 
with the master list o f participant names kept confidential and stored in the principal 
investigator's locked office
Please sign the attached consent form, indicating permission for your child to
participate in the study described above Your signature is required before we can begin
the study. If you have any questions at all, please feel free to ask them now, or if
questions come up later, you can contact me later at the Psychology Department,
777-3486 or 777-3451. Also, feel free to contact Dr Charles Hoots o f the Psychology
Department at 777-4496 or 777-3451 
Sincerely,
Mary K. Devitt, M A.
APPENDIX C 
CONSENT FORM ONE
1 am a graduate student from the Department of Psychology at the University of 
North Dakota. I am conducting research on memory for events over time. Your 
(mother/falher/sister/brother) has told me about some things that happened to you or that 
you saw when you were younger. Now I would like to give you some brief descriptions 
o f the events your (mother/fat her/sister/brother) told me about. After 1 read the 
descriptions of each of the events to you, you may ask questions if you do not understand 
what I have said However, because 1 am interested in how much you remember, your 
(mother/ father/sister/brother) will not be able to provide more information.
The descriptions I give you will be general in nature That is, l will be leaving 
some information out o f the descriptions In order to preserve the scientific value o f this 
research, and because 1 am attempting to study memory for events as it naturally occurs, I 
cannot provide you with a detailed description of any of the events 1 do not anticipate 
that the information withheld from the descriptions will cause you any harm or will put 
you at risk in any way.
After I read the descriptions of the events to you, 1 will send a list of the 
descriptions and a booklet home with you. 1 would like you to think about each of the
events I describe to you each day. On _______ _ and again on _  ___ __ . 1
would like for you to write down what you remember about each o f the events If you 
cannot remember anything, 1 would like you to write that you do not remember the event
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In (two days/two weeks) you wilt return to meet with me or with another investigator at
which time you will be asked to recount the events that l will describe to you today.
I will be videotaping our meeting today. The videotaping is being conducted to 
preserve the subject matter o f our meeting for research or training purposes. The
videotapes will be available only to the investigator and will not identify you in any way.
The videotapes will be kept in the principal investigator's locked office for a period o f no
longer than 3 years.
The principal investigator, Mary Devitt, can be reached at 777-3486 or 777-3451 
if you have any questions or concerns. A copy of this form is available upon request 
By signing this consent form, l understand that:
- 1 will be read descriptions o f events that my (mother/father/sister/brother) has reported; 
- 1 may ask questions at any time, and that those questions will be answered, if possible;
- At the conclusion of this meeting I will be given a list of the described events;
- I have been asked to think about each o f these events each day and to write my
recollections o f  the events in the booklet o n ___________ and o n  ______ _ ;
- If I do not remember an event I will write that I do not remember it in the booklet,
- 1 will return to the laboratory with my (mother/father/sister/brother) in (two days/two 
weeks) time for an interview during which time I will recount the events described today 
to the best of my abilities and turn in the booklet;
- 1 am free to discontinue my participation without penalty.
In addition, by signing this consent form, I understand that
- The meeting today will be videotaped;
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•* The videotapes will not be associated with my name in any way;
- Today's meeting is completely confidential and the content o f the videotape will be 
available only to the principal investigator for research or training purposes;






The purpose for today's meeting is to have you recount the four events that were 
described to you (two days/two weeks) ago Today you will be interviewed about these 
events by an experienced interviewer. This interviewer will first ask you to turn in your 
booklet. The interviewer will then ask you to report each of the events, one by one, in as 
much detail as possible.
The interview will be videotaped in its entirety to preserve the full content o f your 
memory for each of the events. The videotapes and the contents o f your booklet will be 
completely confidential and available to only the principal investigator for research and 
training purposes. Your name will not be associated with the videotape or the booklet in 
any way.
When the interview is concluded, the interviewer will ask you to fill out an 
additional form. When the finai form is filled out, you will be completely informed about 
the nature of this study. During the debriefing phase, any questions you have will be 
answered by the principal investigator.
You are free to discontinue your participation at any time without penalty.
By signing this consent form, I understand that:




-1 will turn in my daily diary booklet;
-1 will be interviewed by an experienced graduate student interviewer;
-1 will report each of the events in as much detail as I am able.
I also understand that;
- Today's interview will be videotaped in its entirety;
- The videotape and the daily diary booklet will be kept completely confidential in a locked 
office, available to only the principal investigator for research or training purposes, and 
that my name will not be associated with the videotape or the booklet in any way;
- 1 will fill out a form when the interview phase has ended;
- At the conclusion of this study, 1 will be completely debriefed and that any questions 1 
may have will be answered by the principal investigator;
-1 am free to discontinue my participation at any time without penalty
If you have any questions or concerns, you may contact Mary Devitt, the principal 





CLARITY AND LIKELIHOOD RATING SCALES
Rate how clear and memorable each o f you memories are Use the following scale (Please 
circle one number only):
1. How clear is your memory for the time you got lost at the mall9
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
not at extremely
alt clear clear
Rate each memory for how likely you think it is that each event occurred. Use the 
following scale (Please circle one number only):
1. How likely is it that you got lost in the shopping mall?
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